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Article 
Rights for Sale 
Tsilly Dagan† & Talia Fisher†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In the 2000 presidential election numerous websites en-
couraged Nader voters in swing states like Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, Oregon, and Pennsylvania to swap their votes with Al Gore 
supporters in Republican-dominated states like Texas.1 The 
idea behind these initiatives was to enhance Gore‘s chances of 
winning the Democratic-pledged electors in the swing states, 
while preserving Nader‘s share of the national popular vote for 
funding purposes.2 Should the legal system have allowed Ralph 
Nader supporters residing in swing states to swap their voting 
rights with Gore supporters residing in Republican-dominated 
states? What about the sale of voting rights for money? Or, to 
take a broader perspective, should the legal system allow the 
exchange or sale of other rights, such as tax benefits? Assume, 
for example, a taxpayer considering a contribution of $1000 to 
her favorite charity, who has no taxable income by which to en-
joy the tax benefit. Should she be able to sell her deduction to 
another taxpayer so that she can enjoy at least part of the in-
centive provided by the Government?  
At first glance, markets for governmentally provided bene-
fits—whether voting rights or tax attributes—may seem prob-
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 1. See Marc J. Randazza, The Constitutionality of Online Vote Swapping, 
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1302–06 (2001) (discussing vote swapping websites 
during the 2000 presidential election). 
 2. Id. at 1303. 
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lematic. Yet for public entitlements such as pollution quotas, 
trade between polluters who do not fully utilize their quotas 
and those who wish to utilize the surplus seems natural and is 
actually encouraged.3 Can the differences in treatment be nor-
matively justified? Does it make sense to overwhelmingly reject 
a market in tax benefits or the sale of votes for money, while 
allowing trade amongst potential polluters? In an attempt to 
resolve these puzzles this Article reexamines existing conven-
tions regarding the alienability of these and other public  
entitlements. 
The rights that individuals enjoy in relation to the gov-
ernment are of assorted types, and include: voting rights, the 
right to trial, procedural safeguards in criminal trial (such as 
the right against self-incrimination), the right to public educa-
tion, the right to pollute, as well as various subsidies and tax 
attributes.4 For simplicity, we term these rights ―Public En-
titlements‖ (PEs). These rights are usually considered from the 
vertical, individual-government perspective.5 This paper, in 
contrast, moves the spotlight to the currently neglected hori-
zontal, individual-individual viewpoint, focusing on the aliena-
bility of the rights. The new perspective of this paper—namely 
combining the discussion of alienability and public entitle-
ments—offers new insights with regard to each of these  
concepts.  
First, expanding the horizons of the alienability discussion 
beyond its traditional arenas of taboo markets (such as organs, 
 
 3. See Andrew M. Wolman, Effluent Trading in the United States and 
Australia, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 7–9 (2003) (providing a brief 
history of pollution trading). 
 4. See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 
1410–11 (2009); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Prop-
erty Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 936–37 (1985). Of course, characterizing 
these attributes as benefits rather than costs or as rights versus duties de-
pends upon one‘s baseline. See Rose-Ackerman, supra, for a further discussion 
of the baseline issue and for a distinction between alienable and inalienable 
rights and duties. The baseline question, and its derivative right/duty classifi-
cation, is immaterial to our current project which focuses on the alienability-
inalienability issue. Obviously there is interdependency between the alienabil-
ity and the baseline issues: whether or not a certain Public Entitlement is 
alienable may affect preferences regarding it and, as a result, may impact its 
initial allocation as well as the political process leading to such allocation. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, 
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347.  
 5. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 931 n.2 (identifying works 
that discuss the traditional view of property rights and the law). 
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babies and sexuality)6 to the unexplored terrain of PEs accen-
tuates the complexity of alienability. Unlike the above men-
tioned classic cases—whose alienability entails concerns of a 
similar nature, typically translating into a binary ―on/off‖ ap-
proach—the PE arena reveals the richness of the normative 
considerations underlying alienability, ranging from efficiency, 
to distribution, commodification, autonomy, and democratic 
participation.7 This complexity of normative underpinnings al-
lows the dismantling of the dichotomy between alienable and 
inalienable resources and the conversion of this conceptually 
deficient binarism into an array of legal mechanisms. We argue 
that the binary choice between alienability and inalienability is 
over-simplistic, if not outright arbitrary.8 Full-blown alienabili-
ty and complete inalienability are actually two endpoints on a 
continuum of legal techniques that serve a variety of normative 
goals. Accordingly, we present a detailed framework of such in-
termediate alienability techniques—ranging from total inalien-
ability, to gifts, to non-monetary exchanges, to full marketabili-
ty. One object of our Article is thus to expose the modularity of 
alienability and facilitate creative ways for its use in promoting 
a wide array of normative goals.  
Second, viewing public entitlements through the currently 
neglected horizontal prism of alienability enriches our under-
standing of PEs and enhances the appreciation of their capacity 
as public policy instruments. In arguing that there is nothing 
inherently inalienable about public entitlements, and adding 
the alienability layer to the concept of PEs, we expose a malle-
able feature of these entitlements currently viewed, unreflec-
 
 6. See Fennell, supra note 4, at 1405 (providing a recent survey of the 
literature on these topics). 
 7. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 937–41 (discussing a range of 
factors to consider in analyzing restrictions on alienability). 
 8. In so doing, we expand on Rose-Ackerman‘s ―modified alienability‖ 
conceptualization, which recognized instances of partial inalienability where 
―sales are forbidden, but gifts are permitted and may even be encouraged by 
state policy.‖ Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 935. We also build on the sug-
gestion that alienability is an adjustable dimension of property ownership as 
opposed to a ―binary switch to be turned on or off . . . .‖ Fennell, supra note 4, 
at 1408. Fennell goes on to demonstrate this non-binarism with a host of ex-
amples ranging from limits on the occurrence of a transfer (through taxes, 
procedural requirements, and other means), to restrictions on the transfer 
price (such as price floors or ceilings), and triggering conditions for a shift of 
control or penalties. Id. at 1443–51. 
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tively, as unitary and rigid.9 A second object of the Article is 
thus to engage in fragmentation of public entitlements. 
We apply the insights regarding the modularity of aliena-
bility and PEs using the counter-intuitive example of tax bene-
fits for charitable contributions. Tax attributes, in general, and 
tax benefits for charitable contributions, in particular, are cur-
rently allocated on a taxpayer basis.10 They are considered in-
herently personal and inalienable: ―the folk definition of ‗taxes‘ 
that governs our fiscal language apparently holds that favora-
ble tax attributes, such as credits and deductions, cannot prop-
erly be traded . . . .‖11 This Article argues that such restrictions 
on the alienability of tax benefits are neither necessary nor de-
sirable. Rather, there could be considerable benefits to consti-
tuting a market in tax attributes for charitable contributions in 
terms of promoting the social goals underlying them. 
 
 9. Conventional wisdom views public entitlements as inalienable, or at 
least considerably limited in alienability. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 745 (1964) (―In addition to being revocable without 
compensation, most forms of largess are subject to considerable limitations on 
their use. Social Security cannot be sold or transferred. A television license 
can be transferred only with FCC permission.‖). According to Susan Rose-
Ackerman: 
Following Charles Reich, many commentators view government 
transfer programs as creating a kind of ‗new property.‘ If so, the new 
property rights are often conditionally coercive. In general, people 
cannot sell or give away their benefits to others, and for some bene-
fits, such as public housing, people forfeit their claim to a service by 
not using it. Even the right to receive straight cash grants through a 
welfare program with no restrictions on use is not a pure property 
right. An eligible person can give the payments she receives to anyone 
but cannot transfer the right to receive these payments.  
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 959 (quoting Reich, supra, at 733). As we will 
show, concerns over full-fledged alienability can be addressed through tar-
geted restrictions on different dimensions of alienability without resorting to 
complete inalienability—leading to a range of formulations of PEs starting 
with completely inalienable entitlements, through entitlements that can only 
be transferred via gifts or trades in kind, and ending with fully marketable 
entitlements. 
 10. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case 
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (―Currently the vast 
majority of tax incentives operate through deductions or exclusions, which link 
the size of the tax preference to a household‘s marginal tax bracket.‖). 
 11. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT‘S 
MARCH TOWARD BANKRUPTCY 17 (2007). Shaviro goes on to describe and criti-
que this assumption regarding the inalienability of tax benefits. See id. at 17–
19. In addition to denying the alienability of tax benefits, policy makers con-
stantly seek ways to curtail tax planning and tax sheltering. See Leo Katz, In 
Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799, 801–09 (2007) (arguing that tax 
planning and tax sheltering leads to inefficiencies and deadweight loss).  
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In order to substantiate our claims, we start out by unveil-
ing the normative considerations at the base of the question of 
alienability. We focus on the classic normative building blocks 
of the alienability debate—efficiency, distribution, autonomy, 
personhood, and democratic participation—and use PE exam-
ples to illustrate how these considerations operate. We then use 
these normative considerations as the framework for construct-
ing intermediate alienability techniques. Namely, we demon-
strate how the normative equilibria formed by the interaction 
between efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and 
participation translate into specific alienability mechanisms 
that run along two axes: The Potential Transferees Axis and 
The Mode of Transfer Axis.12 The Potential Transferees Axis 
distinguishes between alienability regimes in which the re-
source can be transferred to a restricted set of recipients and 
alienability regimes in which the resource can be transferred to 
an unrestricted group of transferees. This axis, we claim, re-
flects the classic tension between distribution and efficiency. 
The Mode of Transfer Axis distinguishes between modes of 
alienability based upon the nature of the transaction. As will be 
demonstrated, this axis differentiates between sales, barters, 
gifts, and waiver of the resource—reflecting different forms and 
relative weights of autonomy, personhood, and participation-
related considerations. The intersection of these two axes gen-
erates seven techniques of alienability (along the alienability 
spectrum) and matches them with specific normative equili-
bria. We conclude with the application of our theory to trade in 
tax benefits for charitable contributions. The application of our 
model will show how specific alienability regimes for the provi-
sion of tax benefits in the context of charitable contributions 
lead to more efficient allocation of those benefits, reinforce dis-
tributive goals, and facilitate taxpayer autonomy, personhood, 
and participation.  
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I surveys the 
normative considerations underlying the question of alienabili-
ty by using examples from the PE arena. Part II uses these 
normative considerations in order to construct intermediate 
alienability techniques: spelling out and exemplifying our tax-
onomy of alienability mechanisms. Part III concludes with the 
application of our theory to trade in tax benefits for charitable 
contributions.  
 
 12. See infra Figure 1. 
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I.  THE NORMATIVE BUILDING BLOCKS OF 
ALENABILITY   
Individuals are entitled to a multitude of rights vis-à-vis 
the government. These can include voting rights, the right to 
trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to public 
education, the right to pollute, as well as various subsidies and 
tax attributes.13 These rights differ from one another in several 
respects: their substantive contents, their normative goals, the 
constitutional protections provided to them, and how they are 
allocated and ultimately distributed.14 Despite these differ-
ences, however, all share the common characteristic of govern-
ing the individual‘s interaction with the government.15 It is this 
feature that attracts the attention of lawyers and dominates 
the discourse on public entitlements.16 However, this vertical 
view of PEs, anchored in the interface between individual and 
government, overlooks their horizontal dimension, relating to 
the potential interaction among individuals. Understanding 
PEs as the object of interaction among individuals links up to a 
host of debates emanating from the realm of private law, cur-
rently not associated with these rights.17 Our discussion will fo-
cus on one such horizontal aspect of public entitlements—their 
alienability. In this Part, we set out to connect PEs to the alie-
nability debate and scrutinize them with the analytical tools 
provided by the extensive literature on alienability. 
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the issue of PE 
alienability can be illustrated by way of comparing the assign-
ment of voting rights, on the one hand, and the allocation of 
pollution quotas, on the other. The right to vote is considered 
 
 13. See Reich, supra note 9, at 734–37 (describing various entitlements 
from the government that can be considered in the context of property rights). 
 14.  See generally id. (describing various forms of government entitlements 
and the relationship between individuals and the government with respect to 
those entitlements). 
 15. See id. at 756 (―The recipient of [government benefits], whether an or-
ganization or an individual, feels the government‘s power.‖). 
 16. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (40th 
Anniversary ed. 2002) (exploring the interaction of competitive capitalism and 
the role of government in the market); Reich, supra note 9 (discussing the  
dominance of the government‘s programs and how individuals interact with 
those programs). 
 17. Examples may include issues of unjust enrichment (which may arise 
when one individual appropriates another‘s PE), torts (when one individual 
impairs another‘s ability to enjoy a PE, when one is harmed by another‘s use 
of a PE use by another, or when one induces the government to breach a PE), 
and contracts. 
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an inalienable right.18 This inalienability is grounded on a so-
cial pre-commitment to a certain distribution of voting rights 
among the public (one vote per person).19 Pollution quotas, by 
contrast, are designed as tradable entitlements.20 The empha-
sis is placed on the aggregate consumption of these benefits, as 
opposed to their ultimate distribution among various individu-
als, thus allowing for the emergence of a market for pollution 
quotas (and for a quota per dollar model).21 In these respects, 
voting rights and pollution quotas represent two antithetical 
paradigms of PE alienability regimes. Despite their disparate 
outcomes, however, it is our contention that they are premised 
on similar normative infrastructures. Our discussion will now 
proceed to expose these shared normative underpinnings—the 
classic considerations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, per-
sonhood, and democratic participation—that emerge as the 
building blocks of the alienability debate. Our application of 
these normative considerations to the context of Public En-
titlements will lead to a nuanced landscape of PE alienability, 
which, in turn, will be the first step toward our construction—
in the next part—of alienability as a non-binary choice.  
A. EFFICIENCY 
Under conditions of perfect competition and zero transac-
tion costs, the ―market produces and distributes [commodities] 
with unsurpassed efficiency and in unsurpassed abundance.‖22 
Where no market failures exist, market forces ensure that re-
sources end up in the hands of the highest value users.23 In the 
absence of a market, those to whom resources are allocated 
may initially derive a suboptimal value from their consump-
tion. Put differently, marketability enhances the value of the 
resource for the initial holder because resources that can be 
 
 18. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 
(2000) (describing the general illegality of vote buying in the United States). 
 19. See id. at 1328 (―Modern society views vote buying with opprobrium.‖). 
 20. See Charles W. Howe, Tradable Discharge Permits: Functioning, His-
torical Applications, and International Potential, 4 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L. & 
POL‘Y 370, 376–79 (1993) (discussing various instances of tradable pollution 
permits in the United States). 
 21. See id. at 371–76 (discussing the functioning of a pollution quota  
system). 
 22. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 167 (1993). 
 23. See Michael Abramowicz, The Law and Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. 
L. REV. 327, 387 (1999) (―[M]arket mechanisms tend to allocate goods to their 
highest valuing users.‖). 
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sold are typically worth more than parallel resources that can-
not be sold.24 Marketability is also an efficient mechanism for 
conveying information as to the potential market value of a 
given resource.25 The market gives clear one-dimensional indi-
cations as to the value of the resource, precluding the need to 
invest in highly specialized and complicated processes of infor-
mation gathering.26 Obviously, under conditions of market fail-
ure—e.g., imperfect information, strategic barriers, or external-
ities—regulating the market or partially restricting alienability 
could be necessary.27 In fact, as noted by Susan Rose-
Ackerman28 and Richard Epstein,29 inalienability can some-
times serve as a cost-effective alternative to restrictions on ac-
quisition or use. As demonstrated by Lee Ann Fennell, restric-
tions on alienability can also provide ex-ante benefits in 
mitigating hold outs, commons and anti-commons tragedies, as 
well as information asymmetries.30 
These market failures notwithstanding, the abovemen-
tioned efficiency considerations can be extended to publicly 
provided entitlements as well. In fact, the existing practice of 
tradable pollution quotas is reflective of such infiltration of 
market logic to the PE realm. Thus, under conditions of perfect 
 
 24. Easterbrook, supra note 4 (―A right that cannot be sold is worth less 
than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold. Those who believe in the 
value of constitutional rights should endorse their exercise by sale as well as 
their exercise by other action.‖); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE 
STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 45–47 (2005) (defining and discussing 
option value). 
 25. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competi-
tive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 246 (1976) (―[T]he price system is 
conventionally praised as an efficient way of transmitting the information re-
quired to arrive at a Pareto optimal allocation of resources . . . .‖). 
 26. See id. (―[T]he price system conveys all the information from the in-
formed individuals to the uninformed.‖).  
 27. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 938–40. 
 28. Id. at 937–41. 
 29. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 
971–78 (1985). 
 30. See generally Fennell, supra note 4. Fennell emphasizes three efficien-
cy-based arguments supporting inalienability. First, inalienability rules might 
reduce the incidence of holdout or hold-up problems: rather than dealing with 
the owners‘ veto power through liability rules, inalienability can encourage ex 
ante the self-selection of owners who are likely to be relatively high-valuing 
users over the long run. Id. at 1438–42. Second, inalienability can serve as an 
alternative means for addressing strategic dilemmas, such as commons and 
anti-commons tragedies. Id. Third, carefully designed inalienability rules can 
more efficiently overcome information asymmetries through the self-selection 
process, prompting high-valuing users to identify themselves. Id. at 1453–55. 
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competition, markets for public entitlements can improve their 
allocation, as well as enhance their value to the initial holder. 
The ―price tagging‖ of public entitlements would improve the 
ability of citizens to estimate their value, as well as constitute a 
good signaling mechanism for the social planner to better align 
the level of supply of these entitlements with the social  
optimum. 
B. DISTRIBUTION 
Distribution considerations are often associated with in-
alienability. In transactions that consistently disadvantage cer-
tain segments of the population, distributive considerations 
may justify the restriction of alienability as a means to prevent 
regressivity.31 Moreover, when money becomes a hegemonic 
type of power and encroaches on other forms of valuation, re-
strictions on alienability may preserve the acoustic separation 
among the various spheres of social capital.32 Put differently, 
allowing the conversion of resources and rights into money 
enables the market to infiltrate various arenas of social and po-
litical influence. This convergence of formerly incommensurable 
arenas could diminish the power of the underprivileged in the 
non-market arenas of social and political influence, while, at 
the same time, giving the affluent the ability to acquire supe-
rior capacities in those same realms.33 Inalienability could be 
required, therefore, to preserve the separate currencies and to 
prevent collusive concentration of powers between and across 
spheres.34 Yet distributive justice considerations do not neces-
sarily dictate the complete preclusion of alienability. In fact, se-
lective use of the alienability device can promote redistribution. 
In light of the fact that marketability enhances the value of re-
sources, allowing for only certain underprivileged segments of 
the population to become market players could have a progres-
 
 31. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1114 (1972) (―Whether an entitlement may be sold or not often affects 
directly who is richer and who is poorer.‖). 
 32. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 932–33.  
 33. The distributive considerations we are referring to are obviously not 
limited to income distribution, but, rather, may include distribution on the ba-
sis of other characteristics. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 
150 (1992); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1098.  
 34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1480 (1989) (―A different sort of argument for inalienabili-
ty . . . would focus on increasing the power of one group in the trade in relation 
to another.‖). 
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sive effect. Think, for example, of body organs. While allowing 
for the free market sale of organs may have adverse distribu-
tive effects in that only the wealthy would be able to purchase 
them, restricting the sale of body organs to be purchased only 
by a central authority—for subsequent allocation on a need-
only basis (rather than to the highest bidder)—may provide sel-
lers with hard currency (paid by the central authority) without 
such adverse distributive results. Such a seller-only market 
mechanism would bypass the double bind entailed in the com-
plete banning of alienability, without privileging the affluent in 
access to organs.  
This set of claims applies equally to the sphere of public 
entitlements. Restricting the alienability of PEs—such as vot-
ing rights—could be justified to counter the concern of the con-
centration of social influence in the hands of privileged 
groups.35 At the same time, PE alienability has the potential to 
circumvent regressive state policies: like other resources, PEs 
are oftentimes allocated regressively, on the basis of certain 
demographic and/or social criteria.36 Making these benefits 
alienable would enable individuals who were overlooked by the 
government in the initial allocation to acquire the benefits ir-
respective of demographic characteristics. For instance, when 
the right to publicly provided fertility treatments is allocated to 
married couples only, making this right alienable may allow for 
gay couples or singles to enjoy the subsidized treatments,  
thereby reducing adverse distributional distortions. 
C. AUTONOMY 
Alienability can also be justified on the basis of autonomy 
considerations. Although the notion of autonomy takes many 
forms, it is generally associated with the granting of effective 
choices to individuals.37 Alienability and the market enable the 
fragmentation of resources and allow for conversion of one type 
 
 35. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 963. 
 36. For an example of a PE allocated in this regressive manner, see Sarah 
Wildman, Not Married? Your Insurance Might Not Cover Fertility Treatments, 
SLATE (Mar. 17, 2010, 9:32 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2248051/ (discussing 
the allocation of certain health insurance rights based on marital status).  
 37. For further discussion of the definition of autonomy, see Robert E. 
Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 655–59 
(2004). 
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of resource into another.38 In this way, they enhance the spec-
trum of choice for individuals. The one-dimensional structure of 
the information regarding the value of a given resource, when 
translated into market terms, could also improve choice-
making capacity by simplifying it. Moreover, alienability and 
the market allow individuals to discard their social identities, 
thereby facilitating exit and increasing social mobility.39 It is 
our contention that similar autonomy-based considerations 
may support PE alienability. Expanding the spectrum of means 
by which a public entitlement can be exercised—for instance, 
by allowing for its partial or full sale on the market—could ex-
pand the spectrum of choices available to the entitlement hold-
er. The current binary structure of all-or-nothing choice with 
respect to exercising PEs hinders more creative utilization of 
these entitlements. In addition, a market for PEs would in-
crease exit capability, which, in turn, facilitates autonomy.  
Yet, alienability could also compromise autonomy in a 
number of ways if, for example, what seems like free exchange 
is missing a truly consensual basis. Sellers may choose to sell 
their resources at sub-market prices due to partial or asymme-
tric information between sellers and buyers, seller carteliza-
tion, or underassessment of risk and long-term interests.40 In 
such settings, alienability restrictions can protect sellers from 
the detrimental outcomes of their own choices, thus substan-
tively protecting autonomy.41 Moreover, even when the en-
titlement is traded at market price, some may claim that the 
transaction compromises autonomy in those instances where 
market price does not fully capture considered judgment of the 
entitlement‘s value.42 There may be room to claim that the po-
 
 38. See David E. Chapman, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 401 (1983) (arguing that many 
people who would not donate their organs would sell them instead). 
 39. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory 
After the Right’s Rise, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 1191, 1266 (2007) (book review) 
(describing the market as a space outside politics). 
 40. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 939 (identifying the asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers). But see Fennell, supra note 4, at 1423–27 (discuss-
ing inalienability as a mechanism for mitigating collective action problems).  
 41. For further discussion in the context of unconstitutional conditions, 
see Sullivan, supra note 34 (―Making . . . rights inalienable because citizens 
may undervalue the worth of those rights to themselves would be classic pa-
ternalism—overruling individuals‘ choices for their own good. Individuals‘ 
choices may diverge from their ‗best‘ interests for many reasons: for example, 
because they underassess risk or undervalue their long-term interests.‖). 
 42. Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 
1918–19 (1987) (―Although a house has market value and we can express our 
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tential for incompatibility between market price and the social 
judgment of value is greater with respect to those resources 
likely to be handed out as government entitlements.43 Finally, 
in certain contexts, a wider range of options may neither result 
in more effective choice, nor in greater autonomy. Too great a 
variety of options may obstruct one‘s ability to rationally rank 
the different alternatives, due to increased information costs as 
well as behavioral effects.44 This may be exacerbated in the 
case of less sophisticated market players, who are susceptible 
to manipulation by more sophisticated counterparts.45 In addi-
tion to choice-related considerations, autonomy justifications 
for inalienability also rest on the tension existing between free 
exit and communal life. The autonomy-enhancing power of cer-
tain communities alongside the benefits of community life de-
rive from barriers to exit placed upon community members. It 
is quite plausible that it is those communities that are easiest 
to discard that are of the least value to their members and vice 
versa, with the family unit a most acute example.46 This line of 
autonomy-based objections to alienability applies to the PE 
realm no less. Such a problematic exit-community link is well 
illustrated by the PE case of voting rights, in which selling 
one‘s vote means discarding her voice in the civic community. 
Accordingly, autonomy considerations can support restricting 
such PE alienability.47  
 
investment in terms of dollars, there is a nonmonetizable, personal aspect to 
many people‘s relationships with their homes.‖). 
 43. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 158–63 (―[P]roviding goods out of 
pooled resources obliterates any connection of specific donors with specific re-
cipients.‖). 
 44. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 102–04, 215–16 
(2004). 
 45. See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1497–98 (―[One concern about redistri-
bution] recognizes that background inequalities of wealth and resources nec-
essarily determine one‘s bargaining position in relation to government, and 
that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties.‖). 
 46. On the other hand, an effective choice to exit makes the decision to 
stay a member all the more meaningful. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 111–
13 (discussing the relative ease or difficulty of discarding certain relationships). 
 47. The problematic exit-community link in the context of PEs is well illu-
strated by the case of voting rights, which refers to the civic community at 
large. By selling one‘s vote, a person discards her voice in the community,  
thereby de facto exiting it. See Karlan, supra note 39, at 1710. 
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D. PERSONHOOD 
Personhood is ordinarily associated with those attributes 
that are integral to human identity, including ―one‘s politics, 
work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, 
experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, [and] charac-
ter . . . .‖48 Commodifying these attributes, it has been claimed, 
can have a reductive effect due to the collapsing of distinguish-
able spheres of valuation into thin monetary terms.49 The exis-
tence of multiple spheres of valuation is crucial to human iden-
tity,50 while perceiving life through the unidimensional prism 
of market price could flatten and alter self-perception.51 The li-
terature on alienability and commodification focuses on such 
limits of the market in regulating human behavior and criticiz-
es the application of market tools to all realms of life.52  
In addition to the general commodification critique, it is 
useful, we hold, to distinguish between two possible manifesta-
tions of commodification, currently weaved together in the lit-
erature.53 The two represent distinct bases for evaluating the 
desirability of alienability. The first relates to the monetization 
of attributes constitutive of identity, what we term ―commodifi-
cation of resources.‖54 The argument is that the sale of certain 
attributes, and perhaps even their subjection to mere market 
logic, alters them and transforms their inherent meaning. Paid-
for companionship is different from going out with friends; 
paid-for care is unlike care by family or friends; selling a kid-
ney is nothing like donating an organ; and sex for money is 
very different from sex for love. The second strand of the com-
 
 48. Radin, supra note 42, at 1906. 
 49. See id. at 1884.  
 50. For an argument that resources differ and should differ not only in 
how much we value them, but also in how we value them, see ANDERSON, su-
pra note 22, at xiii.  
 51. See id. (―If different spheres of social life, such as the market, the fam-
ily and the state, are structured by norms that express fundamentally differ-
ent ways of valuing people and things, then there can be some ways we ought 
to value people and things that can‘t be expressed through market norms.‖). 
 52. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 42; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4. 
 53. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 217–18 (―When value is represented 
as the object of just one generic response, such as desire or pleasure, we don‘t 
bother to consider whether the ways we produce and exchange goods ade-
quately express the other ways we properly value them or one another.‖).  
 54. See id. at 151 (―The goods proper to the personal sphere can only be 
realized through gift exchange. They cannot be procured by paying others to 
produce them, because the worth of these goods depends upon the motive 
people have in providing them.‖). 
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modification critique focuses on the problems associated with 
commercialization of the interaction between individuals, a 
phenomenon we call ―commodification of interactions.‖ Portray-
ing interactions as market transactions and as ―impersonal, 
egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and oriented to ‗exit‘ rather 
than ‗voice‘‖55 strips them of their possible altruistic nature. As 
Anderson argues, preserving arenas of non-market behavior 
and relationships based on care, altruism, and selflessness 
enriches society with essential collective goods.56 
Though the issue of commodification was traditionally 
raised as an objection to the market,57 there are also commodi-
fication effects and personhood-based arguments that support 
alienability.58 For example, marketability may have a liberat-
ing effect in converting resources into monetary instruments. 
The currency of money is democratic, for market players can 
effectively discard social identities that restrict participation in 
other social institutions and arenas. In a world where money 
buys respect, markets can inculcate a sense of value for things 
that might be taken for granted when not paid-for.59 For exam-
ple, inalienability of housework may lead to under-appreciation 
of its economic value, whereas its monetization signifies that it 
has market value.60 From this perspective, the commodification 
of housework is a virtue. 
Similar to the other normative considerations, the commo-
dification debate is applicable in the PE context. PEs, like any 
other resource, vary in how closely they are connected to, and 
 
 55. Id. at 145. 
 56. Id. 
 57. E.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household 
Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84 (1997) (―The standard argument 
against commodification, often referred to as the ‗commodification critique,‘ is 
that certain human attributes or certain resources should lie wholly or partial-
ly beyond exchange, because to allow exchange would be inconsistent with a 
vision of personhood or human flourishing.‖). 
 58. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 5 (1996), 
(―[C]ommodification, in conceiving of the person as a commodity-trader, im-
plies a certain view of human freedom . . . unrestricted choice about what 
goods to trade represents individual freedom, and the maximizing of individu-
al gains from trade represents the individual‘s ideal.‖). 
 59. Cf. Silbaugh, supra note 57, at 90–95 (supporting use of economic 
terms to better recognize and understand the economic aspects of non-market 
activities). 
 60. See id.; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618–
19 (1996) (arguing that taxing housework ―would ensure greater resources for 
women and would represent a congressional recognition of caretaking respon-
sibilities as valuable and productive labor‖). 
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constitutive of, one‘s identity—whether as a person, family 
member, community member, or citizen.61 The divergences 
among the identity-forming components of the different PEs 
lead to varying results when translated into monetary terms: 
whereas, for some PEs, the anonymity and abandonment of so-
cial identity enabled by their marketability has a liberating ef-
fect, for others this dissociation entails significant costs in self-
perception.62  
E. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 
Alienability can also be justified on considerations of demo-
cratic participation. When markets operate in a competitive 
manner, individual players cannot single-handedly control or 
alter the operation of the market forces.63 In this respect, mar-
kets are mechanisms for the decentralization of power in socie-
ty, serving as an alternative to the government decision-
making process and constraining centralistic, otherwise abso-
lute, state power.64  
Alienability in the context of certain PEs could further 
augment the potential of the market to counterbalance gov-
ernment forces. PEs such as voting rights by their very nature 
approximate the decentralizing effect of the market forces.65 
Thus, the initial allocation of voting rights to all citizens in ef-
fect spreads decision-making power equally among them, pro-
viding each individual with a voice and marginal decision-
making power. Transforming decision making into a marketa-
ble commodity and creating a market for voting rights would 
facilitate additional venues of democratic participation (along-
 
 61. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1484–85 (explaining that some attributes 
are ―so closely connected to the person that their alienation would injure per-
sonal identity‖ whereas other approaches ―rank different constitutional rights 
as more or less central to personal identity‖). 
 62. One example of such an identity-constituting PE is the right to vote, 
which plays a role in shaping a person‘s civic identity. The exchange of such 
rights for money ―is a form of dismemberment. If citizens could purchase and 
sell [such] rights, they would have a different and inferior conception both of 
those . . . rights and of themselves.‖ Id. at 1485. 
 63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Politics By 
Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1710–11 (1999) (―[T]he right to vote serves 
a powerful expressive function. This notion is captured in the idea of ‗civic in-
clusion‘ and in the various ways the franchise is used to delineate who is and 
is not a full member of the community.‖). 
 64. Id. at 15.  
 65. Cf. id. at 15–21 (arguing that the market functions to preserve politi-
cal freedom). 
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side the existing option of exercising the right to vote), in the 
form of both passive and active participation.66 Passive partici-
pation refers to mere waiving of the right, which can be a form 
of protest. Active participation through alienability may enrich 
the ways in which an initial right-holder can voice her prefe-
rences by channeling her right to vote to potential voters.67 In 
addition, a market for PEs would establish an option for the 
purchase of double voice by individuals who have strong pref-
erences for affecting the decision-making process.  
However, it is exactly these considerations that may tilt 
the scales against making PEs alienable and, even more so, 
marketable. Though the trade of PEs for money has a prefe-
rence-revealing and liberating potential, as discussed above, it 
may also distort the picture regarding participation prefe-
rences.68 Indeed, those who purchase additional voice may not 
necessarily be those who value it most, but rather often merely 
those who can afford the purchase, and vice versa.69 This could 
be the reason why democratic participation considerations tend 
to tip in favor of inalienability.70  
F. FROM BUILDING BLOCKS TO RECONSTRUCTION 
As we have shown, alienability is consistent with each of 
the five normative considerations discussed thus far—
efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and democratic 
participation—albeit in a complex and multifaceted manner. 
On some levels, all of these considerations support alienability; 
yet on other levels, they each justify inalienability. Nonethe-
less, these internal tensions within each of the normative con-
 
 66. For an analogous use of this distinction in the context of citizenship see 
Shai Lavi, Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Bond of Citi-
zenship and its Criminal Breach, 61 U TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manu-
script at 7), available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/ 
Constitutionalism09-Lavi.pdf. 
 67. For further discussion of active and passive participation in the con-
text of voting rights, see infra Part II.7. 
 68. See Hanoch Dagan, Political Money, 8 ELECTION L.J. 349, 350–51 
(2009) (arguing that in the context of political monetary contributions, money 
can be a legitimate means for expressing preferences, though money reflects 
the intensity of preferences in a ―particularly distorted way due to the effects 
of wealth‖). 
 69. Id. at 356. 
 70. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1483–84 (noting that the distributive 
effect of an inalienability rule depends on the power of the buying and selling 
classes and that ―[t]he ‗purchase‘ of rights may permit otherwise ephemeral 
majorities to aggrandize their power at the expense of entrenched minorities‖). 
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siderations do not obscure the conclusion that, on balance, effi-
ciency and autonomy tend to gravitate towards alienability 
whereas distribution, personhood, and democratic participation 
lean towards inalienability. These opposing orientations give 
rise to an external tension among the various considerations in 
the alienability context. Therefore, framing the choice between 
alienability and inalienability as a binary all-or-nothing deci-
sion turns what we have shown to be a nuanced and multifa-
ceted matter into a crude and simplistic bottom line. There is 
nothing inherent or essential in the association of each of the 
specific normative considerations with either alienability or in-
alienability. Even if alienability poses challenges in terms of 
the various normative ends, this need not rule it out altogether. 
Indeed, restricting full alienability need not collapse into com-
plete inalienability, or vice versa. The challenges posed by alie-
nability are not uniform and, thus, the remedies called for need 
not be of a single nature, both in degree and kind. For example, 
the personhood problems associated with commodification of a 
resource as a result of full marketability are unlike those deriv-
ing from the distributive concerns associated with providing 
the wealthy with greater decision-making power. The same 
holds true with respect to the considerations supporting alie-
nability. The efficiency benefits associated with placing a given 
resource in the hands of its most valuable user differ from the 
autonomy justifications and liberating effects of extra choice. 
We suggest, therefore, that tinkering with various aspects of 
alienability in a manner that accommodates these differential 
normative ends will assist in crafting creative alienability  
mechanisms better suited to the full range of normative equili-
bria. With this insight in mind, we lay out below a modular and 
more nuanced set of alienability mechanisms, better suited to a 
non-binary conception. 
II.  A NON-BINARY CONCEPTION OF ALIENABILITY   
We will now construct alienability mechanisms that ac-
commodate our non-binary conception of the choice between 
alienability and inalienability, using the basic normative foun-
dations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and 
democratic participation. As mentioned above, the central pre-
mise of our argument is that the choice between alienability 
and inalienability need not be a binary all-or-nothing decision. 
Integrating the five normative considerations into a nuanced 
model of alienability yields a spectrum of choices running along 
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two axes: the mode of transfer and the set of potential  
transferees.  
The Mode of Transfer Axis breaks down into four distinct 
categories according to the gradual means by which the initial 
right holder can dispose of a PE: waiver (non-consumption); gift 
(transfer for no consideration); barter (transfer for non-
monetary consideration); and sale (transfer for monetary con-
sideration). The Potential Transferees Axis divides into two 
broad categories, each referring to the potential transferees to 
whom a PE can be transferred: unrestricted (transfer may be to 
any member of the public at large); and restricted (transfer 
may only be to a pre-selected group of potential recipients in-
cluding the government). Pre-selected recipients can include 
members of communities distinct in their religious, ethnic, 
ideological, or cultural affiliation; groups that share unique 
traits, such as a socio-economic background, income level, 
gender, physical abilities, or sexual orientation; and the family 
unit. The intersection of these two axes creates seven71 applica-
ble categories of alienability mechanisms, as illustrated by the 
table below: 
 
Figure 1: 
 
 71. Category B is irrelevant in the PE context because individuals can on-
ly waive those PEs to the government as opposed to the public at large. 
 Potential Transferees Axis 
Restricted Transferees Unrestricted Transferees 
 
 
Mode of 
Transfer 
Axis 
Waiver  Inalienability  
A 
Meaningless 
B 
Gift 
 
Restricted Gift 
C 
Unrestricted Gift 
D 
Barter 
 
Restricted Barter 
E 
Unrestricted Barter 
F 
Sale  
 
Restricted Sale 
G 
Unrestricted Sale 
 (full alienability) 
H 
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Each box in the table (with the exception of Box B), 
represents what we refer to as a specific ―mechanism of aliena-
bility‖ and reflects a particular composite of the normative con-
siderations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, and democrat-
ic participation. As a general rule of thumb, the Potential 
Transferees Axis correlates with the efficiency-distribution  
tradeoff, whereas the distinctions running along the Mode of 
Transfer Axis reflect autonomy-personhood-participation bal-
ances of various sorts. In other words, mechanisms that fall 
under the Restricted Transferees Column (Categories A, C, E, 
G) reflect a greater concern for distributive justice,72 whereas 
the mechanisms in the parallel Unrestricted Transferees Col-
umn (Categories B, D, F, H) are more attuned to the promotion 
of efficiency.73  
Similarly, the categories along the Mode of Transfer Axis 
are distinguishable on autonomy-,74 personhood-,75 and demo-
cratic participation-related76 criteria. The Sale Row (Categories 
G,H) relates to instances where enabling the conversion of a PE 
into monetary terms would enhance autonomy and choice-
making capacity. These categories target cases in which com-
plete commodification of both the resource and the interaction 
between the parties facilitates autonomy. The Barter Row 
(Categories E,F) represents a different class of cases, in which 
there is opposition to setting a monetary price tag on the par-
ticular PE, but commercializing the party interaction is not 
considered problematic. In other words, by allowing quid-pro-
quo exchanges while prohibiting monetary consideration, this 
set of mechanisms reflects a particular type of personhood and 
anti-commodification tendencies, countering the commodifica-
tion of the resource rather than the commodification of the par-
ty interaction. The Gift Row (Categories C,D), which precludes 
all forms of consideration, reflects a more complete version of 
anti-commodification sentiments: for the PEs falling under this 
category, there is opposition to the very quid-pro-quo nature of 
the interaction between the parties, not only to the commodifi-
cation of the resource. Still, the gift allows for the use of the 
particular PE also by individuals other than the initial right 
holder.  
 
 72. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 73. See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra notes 48–62 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
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This brings us to the final row: Waiver (Category A). The 
waiver category relates to instances in which the only permit-
ted use is self-consumption of the PE by the initial right holder, 
who, although she can choose to forfeit it, cannot transfer the 
entitlement to others (and therefore cannot exchange it or sell 
it). The divide between waiver and gift correlates with the dis-
tinction between the two forms of democratic participation dis-
cussed above: passive and active participation.77 Waiver offers 
only passive participation in the decision-making process (in 
addition to self consumption of the PE), whereas the gift cate-
gory represents cases in which the initial right holder can not 
only consume the right herself or waive it altogether, but also 
affect the channeling of the right to other potential users, thus 
actively participating in the decision-making process as to its 
ultimate distribution.  
The rough typology that we sketch above is by no means 
exhaustive. We are surely not arguing that each of the norma-
tive considerations should be restricted to its assigned column 
or row in the above table. Their scope is obviously broader than 
that. For example, preferring a gift mechanism to sale may 
surely emanate from distributive justice considerations and not 
solely from personhood rationales.78 Likewise, allowing for 
transactions with unrestricted transferees rather than limiting 
the range of recipients may stem from autonomy rationales and 
not only efficiency considerations. Our admittedly stylized 
presentation is meant only to provide a preliminary demonstra-
tion of the center of gravitation with respect to each normative 
mix. We will now elaborate on the normative equilibrium in 
each of the categories using illustrative examples—some of 
which refer to existing practices while others are yet to be im-
plemented. A caveat is called for, however: the examples we 
provide are preliminary in nature. They are intended to serve 
as an initial context for each of the categories rather than to 
provide a comprehensive analysis or a normative prescription. 
As befitting the general thrust of the paper, the examples we 
chose as illustrations for each of the categories below all belong 
to the PE domain. Obviously, the categories of alienability we 
 
 77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 78. See W. Stephen Westermann, A Theory of Autonomy Entitlements: 
One View of the Cathedral Nave Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and Other 
Individual Liberties 4 n.8 (Apr. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=977964 (arguing that ―one possible motivation for 
permitting gifts but not sales of human organs is to avoid the regressive result 
of disproportionate sales by citizens who are poor‖). 
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construct can also be applied outside of the realm of public en-
titlements; therefore, similar archetypical examples for each of 
the categories can be found, but this discussion is beyond the 
scope of our paper.  
A. UNRESTRICTED SALE: POLLUTION QUOTAS 
The alienability mechanism represented by Category H is 
the unrestricted sale of Public Entitlements. Pollution quotas 
offer a paradigmatic example of this category.79 Here, the nor-
mative considerations gravitate towards efficiency. Under con-
ditions of perfect competition and zero transaction costs, trada-
ble pollution quotas end up in the hands of the highest value 
users, regardless of their initial allocation.80 Initial holders of 
pollution rights who yield sub-optimal value from their direct 
consumption are incentivized to sell their quotas to higher val-
ue users.81 In addition, implementing a tradable quotas regime 
creates incentives for the initial right-holders to invest addi-
tional resources in pollution minimization research and devel-
opment, because manufacturers that succeed in such innova-
tions will enjoy a competitive advantage and enhance their 
trading possibilities.82 A final advantage of pollution quota 
trading is that it holds aggregate pollution levels steady at the 
desired social level.83  
Restricting such trade by limiting the potential recipients 
of the pollution quotas could undermine these positive effects.84 
 
 79. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environ-
mental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341–51 (1985) (discussing a system of 
tradable pollution rights); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: 
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11, 21–
24 (discussing strategies for preserving environmental resources). 
 80. Wolman, supra note 3, at 3. 
 81. Abramowicz, supra note 23, at 353–54 (―[P]ollution rights will tend to 
flow to those for whom pollution abatement is most expensive . . . .‖).  
 82. James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for De-
signing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 374 
(1989) (―Because costs for controlling emissions vary among plants, some 
sources will install pollution control devices, reduce their emissions, and sell 
their excess emissions use rights . . . . Over time, polluting becomes more ex-
pensive, and polluters have a greater incentive to reduce their emissions.‖). 
 83. Howe, supra note 20, at 373.  
 84. See, e.g., Tripp & Dudek, supra note 82, at 387 (citing a Wisconsin wa-
ter pollution allocation program‘s failure as due, at least in part, to the fact 
that the rights are not freely tradable amongst polluters, ―which impairs the 
value of the rights‖). But see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 79, at 1350 (as-
serting that the market system might permit ―the creation of relatively high 
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When achieving efficient results as described is the dominant 
social goal, the unrestricted transferees option would be the 
superior choice.85 Moreover, the sale of pollution quotas does 
not seem to entail any significant autonomy-related or person-
hood concerns: pollution quotas are not intimately connected to 
one‘s personhood, involve no interpersonal relations, and are 
not constitutive of identity.86 Nor does the sale of pollution quo-
tas give rise to any anti-commodification objections, either with 
regard to the object of trade (pollution quotas) or with respect 
to the actual commercialization of the interaction between the 
parties.87 Hence, the choice of the sale rubric on the Mode of 
Transfer Axis emerges as optimal. 
B. RESTRICTED SALE: POLLUTION QUOTAS REFINED 
The main opposition to the notion of tradable pollution qu-
otas emanates from environmental justice advocates, who are 
concerned about the distributive implications of such a trade 
regime.88 The central argument they raise is that the classic 
economic analysis of tradable pollution quotas presupposes an 
 
concentrations of particular pollutants in small areas within the larger pollu-
tion control region‖ and subsequent toleration of ―hot spots‖). 
 85. See Abramowicz, supra note 23, at 354 (arguing that trading prices 
indicate the cost of additional pollution reduction, allowing companies to 
change their strategy, method, or price as the market evolves, and stating that 
―[t]his dynamic adjustment could not be achieved if the initial pollution en-
titlements were fixed‖). But see Wolman, supra note 3, at 3 (―Some economists 
have pointed out that in the real world marketable permit systems could expe-
rience domination from a single firm or small handful of firms or could fail to 
perform well . . . .‖). 
 86. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Envi-
ronmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral 
Perceptions and Civic Enforcement, 36 J.L. & SOC‘Y 501, 519–20, 526–27 
(2009). In a study examining how various instruments of environmental regu-
lation affect people‘s moral intuitions, participants had the lowest moral out-
rage (toward the pollution source) and emotional reaction (to the pollution it-
self ) to the market-based instrument of environmental taxation. Id. at 508–09, 
519 tbl.1. The researchers found that participants had a ―significant tolerance‖ 
for the use of environmental taxation, positing that this market instrument 
had a legitimizing effect from the joint operation of the rule of law (legalizing 
the pollution) and the effect of paying for the right to use (pollute) public as-
sets. Id. at 526–27. 
 87. See id. at 508, 527 (concluding that the study results are contradictory 
to the commodification critique, which suggests that use of market-based in-
struments may be a legitimate mechanism for authorizing use of public  
resources). 
 88. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: 
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollu-
tants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 580–87 (2001). 
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even playing-field on which the market operates.89 However, 
they maintain, in the real world, socio-economic factors, income 
levels, and racial characteristics all affect the initial platform 
where market players act, tipping the scales in favor of certain 
groups.90 Due to these inequalities, market-based mechanisms 
may fail to distribute environmental benefits fairly, the result 
being a disproportionate concentration of pollution quotas in 
the hands of certain groups, as well as a disproportionate con-
centration of pollutants in geographic regions of vulnerable 
groups (known as ―pollution hotspots‖).91  
It is our contention that this dichotomous framing debate 
as a question for or against a tradable quota regime is mislead-
ing, since it presumes a binary choice between full marketabili-
ty and complete inalienability of pollution quotas. As can be 
seen from our model, the choice need not be binary, but rather 
a continuum of alienability mechanisms is possible. The distri-
butive concerns raised in this debate should be addressed by 
moving along the Potential Transferees Axis to the restricted 
sale rubric rather than by rejecting the possibility of sale alto-
gether. Restricting the sale of quotas to polluters located within 
the same geographic unit would not aggravate the current dis-
tribution of pollution, whereas further restricting the buyers of 
pollution quotas to polluters located in less polluted areas 
would actually have a positive redistributive effect. In other 
words, delineating the group of transferees to whom pollution 
quotas can be sold would prove beneficial when distributional 
concerns are placed at the center. The alienability mechanism 
under Category G is well-suited to temper such distributive 
justice concerns, without forfeiting all the benefits of trade in 
pollution quotas. 
C. RESTRICTED BARTER: PLEA-BARGAINING 
The alienability mechanism embodied in Category E facili-
tates exchange in kind of PEs with restricted transferees. A pa-
radigmatic example in this context would be the practice of plea 
bargaining, where a defendant effectively exchanges his Fifth 
 
 89. See id. at 580–81. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 574–81. It should be noted, however, that any tradable quota 
regime operates under conditions of a preexisting allocation of pollution and 
polluters. Polluting plants are often located in lower-class neighborhoods to 
begin with, and, in light of this initial allocation, allowing for the tradability of 
pollution quotas may often inflate the levels of pollution in such areas. Id. at 
580–81. 
 2011] RIGHTS FOR SALE 113 
 
Amendment right against self-incrimination,92 his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial,93 and his right to appeal94 for 
punishment concessions from the prosecution.95 
The object of exchange in the case of plea bargaining—the 
defendant‘s liberty—is fundamental to one‘s personhood.96 This 
fundamentality justifies its incommensurability across spheres 
of valuation.97 At the same time, exchanges within a single 
sphere—for the same type of currency—do not raise similar 
personhood concerns. Thus, a waiver of the right against self-
incrimination (a cost in terms of one‘s liberty) can only be ex-
changed for punishment concessions (a benefit in terms of his 
liberty).98 Relinquishing liberty for monetary consideration, in 
contrast, could have a reductive effect on the meaning of liber-
ty.99 This anti-commodification stance with respect to the na-
ture of the resource being exchanged is what sets plea bargains 
 
 92. See Brenna K. DeVaney, The “No-Contact” Rule: Helping or Hurting 
Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 933, 942 
(2001) (―[E]ntering into a plea bargain . . . [t]he defendant is essentially waiv-
ing many significant rights, including a trial by a jury of peers, the confronta-
tion of witnesses, and the right to challenge the evidence against him.‖). 
 93. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 
(2003) (claiming that the right to a jury trial or the right against self-
incrimination is routinely bargained away in the criminal arena, in exchange 
for sentence reduction). 
 94. E.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–54 (1990); see also  
Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1693 (2001) (arguing that defendants bargain away their 
right to appeal through plea bargaining). 
 95. Note that our model is aimed at devising alienability mechanisms 
with regard to PEs. However, analogous considerations and similar mechan-
isms could apply in the non-PE context. A parallel, non-PE test case falling 
under Category E is the example of blood bank donations. Allowing the ex-
change of blood donations solely for blood insurance while banning sale of 
blood for monetary consideration is supported by similar, non-commodificatory 
rationales.  
 96. See Mazzone, supra note 93, at 827 (―[M]aking constitutional rights 
alienable undermines the individual dignity that these rights are meant to 
protect.‖). 
 97. In light of the link between liberty and autonomy, we would like to 
also preserve the option of waiving these procedural safeguards. We do not 
highlight this angle in our discussion here simply because, at this point, we 
wish to focus solely on the sale-barter distinction, as opposed to the inaliena-
bility-barter perspective.  
 98. See Mazzone, supra note 93, at 805 (discussing the mechanics of waiv-
er of right against self-incrimination in exchange for punishment concessions). 
 99. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can‘t Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets, Address at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in 21 THE 
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94 (2000) (providing a discussion of 
the corruptive effects of comodification). 
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apart from pollution quotas and, more generally, what distin-
guishes sellable PEs from those exchangeable in kind only.  
Unlike the reservations regarding price-tagging liberty and 
commodifying the object of exchange in plea bargaining, similar 
anti-commodificatory concerns do not arise with regard to the 
actual bargaining process between the prosecution and defense 
or to the quid-pro-quo nature of their interaction.100 In fact, 
opening the criminal justice arena to negotiations enhances the 
defendant‘s decisional autonomy101 and her right to exert effec-
tive control over the manner in which her fate is determined.102 
Thus, while reducing the object of exchange (liberty in our ex-
ample) into monetary terms impairs personhood by collapsing 
distinguishable spheres of valuation into market terms, the 
ability of the parties to exchange resources within a single 
sphere of valuation (in our case, liberty for liberty) enhances 
their choice-making capacity.103  
D. UNRESTRICTED BARTER: SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
The alienability mechanism represented by Category F is 
barters—exchanges in kind only—with unrestricted transfer-
ees: a paradigmatic example in this category is the bartering of 
public school vouchers.104 Assume that a variety of high schools 
in a hypothetical local municipality, offer, in addition to an 
identical core curriculum, specific fields of specialization: some 
schools focus on the liberal arts and humanities, while others 
are more science-oriented. For the purpose of illustration, sup-
pose that under such a regime, each potential student is allo-
 
 100. But see George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More 
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 220–26 (1977) (arguing that an absolute 
right to waiver can potentially ―involve [an] unacceptable exploitation of a de-
fendant‘s ignorance or too costly a sacrifice of the need to accomplish or at 
least appear to accomplish accuracy‖).  
 101. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 346–47 (discussing the exchange of 
constitutional rights for monetary and non-monetary benefits). 
 102. See Dix, supra note 100, at 219 (discussing the notion of defendant  
autonomy).  
 103. For further discussion of the autonomy-related considerations under-
lying plea-bargaining, see generally Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bar-
gaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943 
(2007). 
 104. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (dis-
cussing the constitutionality of school vouchers in the context of the Estab-
lishment Clause); Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth 
Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (advocating for the 
adoption of a public school voucher system to alleviate the problems of under-
resourced schools). 
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cated a voucher allowing her to attend the school that is closest 
to her place of residence. The reason for this allocation is to en-
sure enrollment of a relatively equal number of students at 
each school. Allowing each student to barter her voucher for 
another voucher would be a Pareto improvement in that it 
would better tailor education to individual preferences.105 
School vouchers would thus end up in the hands of higher value 
users, regardless of the original allocation. The unrestricted na-
ture of the barter increases the number of potential transac-
tions, while the alternative of placing restrictions on such ex-
changes may undermine these positive effects. Thus, when 
efficiency through preference satisfaction and enhanced choice 
in education are the dominant social goals, the unrestricted re-
cipients (Category F) is preferable to Category E on the Poten-
tial Transferees Axis.  
If we were to highlight the distributional effect on the effi-
ciency-distribution tradeoff, however, Category E could prove to 
be the superior potential transferees option. For example, if it 
were to emerge that schools focusing on liberal arts attract a 
disproportionate number of female students, while those focus-
ing on the sciences were the favored choice of males—and as-
suming this to be an objectionable outcome from a social pers-
pective—restricting barters to same-sex recipients could prove 
preferable. Allowing female students to exchange vouchers only 
with other female students, with the same restriction applied to 
male students, would preserve the male-female ratio at each 
school. At the same time, the schools would better accommo-
date the preferences of individuals within each group: females 
with a lesser aversion for the sciences would end up in the 
science-oriented schools and a similar result would obtain for 
male students preferring the liberal arts.  
With regard to the Mode of Transfer Axis, similar claims 
can be raised in the context of the right to education as those 
made above regarding criminal procedure safeguards. The ob-
ject of exchange in the context of school vouchers—the individ-
 
 105. But note, unlike in-kind exchanges, a conversion of school vouchers 
into monetary currency could, in effect, distort the preference-revealing  
mechanism at their base in those instances when affluent people bid higher 
even when their preferences are lower. Disallowing such conversion of vouch-
ers into money by restricting the transaction to a single valuation sphere 
(vouchers for vouchers only) would avert these distortions, thus enabling true 
preferences to be revealed and different vouchers to be channeled to their 
highest-valuing users. This point can obviously be phrased in distribution 
terms as well. 
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ual‘s right to education—is, like liberty, formative of one‘s per-
sonhood.106 Whereas exchanging one form of education for 
another form of education increases the range of currently 
available choices and, at the same time, sustains the student‘s 
personhood and prospective choice-making capacity, relinquish-
ing the right to education altogether for monetary considera-
tion (or for no consideration whatsoever, as in the case of gifts 
under Category D) will curtail the future ability to choose from 
among alternative ways of life. This justifies the incommensu-
rability of the right to education for money.107 Note, however, 
that it is the exchange of education for money that is proble-
matic, rather than the quid-pro-quo nature of the interaction 
between the exchanging voucher-holders.  
E. UNRESTRICTED GIFT: RIGHT TO FILE SUIT  
The Category D mechanism of alienability is gifts—for no 
consideration—to members of the public at large, with dona-
tions of organs for transplant a classic example in the non-PE 
arena.108 In the PE context, a hypothetical example under this 
category would be the right to file suit. It could be plausibly 
claimed that forbidding all forms of alienability with respect to 
such a right—i.e., restricting the victim‘s options to either file 
suit herself or waive the right altogether—would undermine 
deterrence and hinder compensation in circumstances in which 
she lacks the financial, cultural, and emotional resources ne-
cessary to access the court.109 Moving from inalienability to a 
gift regime on the Mode of Transfer Axis, then, would enable 
the transfer of the right to file suit from the victim to more so-
phisticated players in the legal system. The marginal costs of 
additional court proceedings could be lower for the latter than 
 
 106. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (starting his 
reasoning from the viewpoint that education is an essential part of being free). 
 107. Moreover, for those who insist that education must be essentially  
merit-based, arguing that any involvement of money taints the very nature of 
education, the possibility of exchange rather than sale of school vouchers 
would prevent these negative spillover effects. 
 108. See generally Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational 
Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107 (discussing whether 
payment for oocytes is appropriate or if it should be a donation based transac-
tion); Sara Krieger Kahan, Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End 
the Organ Shortage, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757 (2009) (addressing current  
methods for organ donation and the possibility of financial incentives). 
 109. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 
YALE L.J. 697, 736–42 (2005) (arguing that plaintiffs purchasing tort claims 
will prevail more in court). 
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the former, turning the action into a positive value claim for 
them.110 Such effects can also result from the consolidation, by 
a single player, of claims relating to different victims. More-
over, even when the value of the claim does not increase sub-
stantially with the transfer of the right, another important so-
cial purpose is served by the gift option: individuals who wish 
to participate in the public discourse through the legal system 
are given access to the courts by enabling them to use original 
victims‘ unexercised right to bring suit. At the same time, a 
transfer of this right allows the victims themselves to voice 
their claims vicariously via the transferees.111 Thus, allowing 
for the transfer of the right to sue not only contributes to deter-
rence, but also enhances participation in public deliberation. In 
instances where these normative considerations are of para-
mount concern, the gift mechanism is preferable to inalienabili-
ty. Yet there may be cause to object to a progression from gift to 
sale. As argued by proponents of the champerty doctrine,112 
commodifying the right to sue—especially in the context of  
bodily harm—could have the derivative reductive effect of 
commodifying the victim‘s bodily integrity.113 The personal na-
ture of the lawsuit could be tainted when traded for monetary  
consideration.114 
On the Potential Transferees Axis, the ability to transfer 
the right to file suit to unrestricted recipients would promote 
efficiency and deterrence. Constraining such a transfer with re-
strictions on the potential recipients of the right could under-
mine these social objectives by excluding capable litigators for 
no good distributive reason.  
 
 110. Mass tort cases are a good example in this respect. See id. (discussing 
the pooling of torts cases by a purchaser). 
 111. See id. at 740 (―[T]ransfers of claims allow plaintiffs to obtain better 
representation or to bring claims that otherwise would not be worth  
bringing . . . .‖).  
 112. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Dis-
covery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
773, 818 (2011) (―The [champerty] doctrine‘s underlying policy is to discourage 
excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigation, which is often associated with 
third parties seeking profit for themselves, rather than redress for their 
clients, through suits.‖). 
 113. See Abramowicz, supra note 109, at 704. 
 114. See id. at 724. For further discussion of the commodification of legal 
claims, see id. at 697–779. 
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F. RESTRICTED GIFT: CONSCRIPTION EXEMPTION  
The Category C mechanism of alienability is gifts—
transfer for no consideration—to a restricted group of reci-
pients. An illustrative example is the right to exemption from 
mandatory conscription.115 In countries with mandatory con-
scription, some communities typically enjoy exemption rights, 
usually on religious or cultural grounds.116 In Israel, for in-
stance, the ultra-Orthodox can obtain an exemption from mili-
tary duty if they prove exclusive devotion of their time to reli-
gious study.117 Such rights of exemption are currently 
nontransferable and are granted on a case-by-case, renewable 
basis.118 The government, however, lacks sufficient information 
to detect the most promising religious scholars and those truly 
interested in fully applying themselves to their studies.119 This 
may lead to over-inclusion of unworthy or less interested reli-
gious scholars and under-inclusion of commendable and dedi-
cated ones.120 An alternative allocation mechanism (one that 
would fall under Category C) that could alleviate this problem 
would be to grant transferable exemption rights but with po-
tential transferees specifically limited to members of the ultra-
 
 115. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Pub-
lic Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 943 (1991) 
(discussing ―narrow, effectiveness-related exemptions‖ for those unfit to serve, 
as well as conscription systems with ―broader policy-related exemptions‖ for 
individuals deemed capable of performing worthier roles elsewhere in society). 
 116. See, e.g., Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Religious Conscientious Objection 
and the Establishment Clause in the Rehnquist Court: Seeger, Welsh, Gillette, 
and § 6( j) Revisited, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 248 (2003) (discussing 
a statute that only exempted members of religious denominations whose te-
nets forbade the bearing of arms from a mandatory national conscription law 
enacted during the Civil War).  
 117. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP‘T 
OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71423.htm#occterr (explain-
ing Israel‘s Tal Law, which allows ultra-Orthodox Jews to postpone military 
service in one-year increments to pursue full-time studies at religious schools). 
 118. See id. (specifying that individuals exempted from conscription under 
the Tal Law must renew their deferment each year by proving they are still 
full-time students). 
 119. See Barak Medina, Political Disobedience in the IDF: The Scope of the 
Legal Right of Soldiers to be Excused from Taking Part in Military Activities in 
the Occupied Territories, 36 ISR. L. REV. 73, 80 (2002) (suggesting that not all 
cases of exemptions granted to ultra-Orthodox Jews by the Tal Law reflect 
―full‖ conscientious objection). 
 120. See id. at 92–95 (discussing the intense political debate and scrutiny 
surrounding the broad scope and consequences of the Tal Law‘s exemptions, as 
well as suggesting that the refusal of some individuals to serve is ―unjustified‖).  
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Orthodox community. This sort of transferability would serve 
as a partial preference-revealing mechanism vis-à-vis commu-
nity members and, at the same time, allow for community lead-
ers to fine-tune the ultimate allocation of exemptions, including 
through the imposition of social and religious sanctions and 
rewards.121 Restricting the group of potential transferees en-
sures the internalization of the benefits by the community, the-
reby preserving the distribution of conscription duties across 
communities in line with the social planner‘s initial intention, 
while preventing a spillover of the exemption phenomenon into 
other sectors of society.122  
As to the Mode of Transfer Axis, in the context of conscrip-
tion exemptions, autonomy considerations validate the border-
line between the gift and barter categories. Personhood con-
cerns tilt against a quid-pro-quo exchange of military 
exemption rights for two reasons. First, the exchange of exemp-
tions rights for other resources would dilute their expressive 
value as a sign of excellence in religious scholarship. Second, 
the commodification of the interaction would taint the altruistic 
nature of the transfer of the exemption right to fellow commu-
nity members and would transform communal bonds.123 The 
borderline between inalienability and gift on this axis is sup-
ported by participation considerations. By transferring the con-
scription exemption to another member of his community, the 
transferor affects the ultimate distribution of the exemption 
rights. The gift regime, unlike total inalienability, thus allows 
individuals to participate in the decision-making process re-
 
 121. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of self-
regulation of a community by its leaders, see Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-
Regulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97–99 (1995) (arguing that advan-
tages of self-regulation include better access to information and expertise, 
lower monitoring costs, and the internalization of administrative costs, and 
arguing that the disadvantages of self-regulation include the potential for 
rent-seeking behavior and abuse of power by community leaders themselves). 
 122. For an example of how the group of potential transferees who may 
benefit from the Tal Law‘s conscription exemption is restricted, see Medina, 
supra note 119 (explaining that the current policy in Israel is to grant exemp-
tions to ultra-Orthodox Jews while denying the same sort of exemption from 
military conscription to individuals who refuse to serve based on non-religious 
grounds, including opposition to the Israel Defense Forces‘ policies). 
 123. Cf., e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 947 (providing an example 
of how commodification of gifts may impact altruism by discussing the impli-
cations of allowing individuals to purchase donated blood and suggesting that 
turning blood into a saleable commodity might actually deter donors who 
thought they were providing a ―gift‖ from donating blood). 
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garding the allocation of exemptions, and derivatively, who will 
engage in religious studies.124 
G. INALIENABILITY: VOTING RIGHTS 
Category A encompasses inalienable PEs. The cases falling 
under this category are distinguishable from other classes of 
cases in that declining to exercise these rights results in their 
complete waiver (as opposed to non-exercise only by the initial 
rights-holder). The paradigmatic case under Category A is vot-
ing rights. Unlike in the case of pollution quotas, the allocation 
of inalienable voting rights stems from a social pre-
commitment to their equal distribution among the public (one 
vote per person, regardless of social or political status).125 Un-
der prevailing law, one cannot buy someone else‘s voting right 
to augment one‘s own voting power (i.e., cast two votes instead 
of one in support of the political candidate that one favors), nor 
can votes be bought in order to silence the supporter of a politi-
cal opponent (i.e., to diminish the political support of the buy-
er‘s least-favored candidate).126 In the terms of our model, vot-
ing rights can thus be described as a paradigmatic Category A 
case.127 On the Potential Transferees Axis—in the efficiency/ 
distribution tradeoff—the normative equilibrium therefore gra-
vitates towards distribution, since efficiency considerations do 
 
 124. In fact, for ultra-Orthodox Jews, this decision may amount to vica-
rious participation in Bible scholarship. Supporting Bible scholarship by oth-
ers is an ideal in and of itself under Judaic Law and is considered the equiva-
lent of Bible studying by the supporter in terms of the spiritual virtuousness it 
offers. See DIANE TICKTON SCHUSTER, JEWISH LIVES, JEWISH LEARNING: 
ADULT JEWISH LEARNING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 52–54 (2003) (encourag-
ing Jewish adults to support others‘ Jewish learning by reinforcing such prac-
tice through encouragement and reward). 
 125. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 963 (arguing that ―[v]ote selling 
is widely recognized to be inconsistent with egalitarian, democratic principles 
because it biases political decisions in favor of the wealthy‖).  
 126. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1324 n.1 (discussing the legal conse-
quences of ―vote buying‖ in the United States). Other examples of inalienable 
PEs include entitlements of the regulatory and welfare states, such as social 
security and welfare benefits. See Radin, supra note 42, at 1854 n.20. With re-
spect to the Mode of Transfer Axis, the very ability not to consume food 
stamps, a form of welfare benefits, allows eligible consumers to dissociate 
themselves from other needy individuals and reflects respect for their non-
material preferences. As far as efficiency and distribution considerations are 
concerned, waiver promotes efficient distribution of such benefits by acting as 
a preference-revealing mechanism. 
 127. But see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 137 
(2000) (challenging the traditional opposition to vote buying in the corporate law 
context and pointing to circumstances where such buying may be desirable).  
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not unequivocally support marketability in this case.128 Though 
at first glance selling votes for money seems like a good way to 
allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences, it also 
would generate substantial costs.129 Critics note a host of ineffi-
ciencies entailed by vote trading, including the negative exter-
nalities that could be imposed on the public at large when vote 
buyers attempt to rent-seek by using their post-election politi-
cal power and access to the public treasury to pay for their ex-
ante vote buying.130 Another source of inefficiency is the poten-
tial for ―coalitions of vote buyers and sellers to monopolistically 
prevent competition for the sale of votes.‖131 A third concern, 
raised by Levmore, relates to collective action problems asso-
ciated with vote selling.132 
The distributive argument against vote trading is premised 
upon its regressive effects. If vote buying were allowed, the 
poor would likely sell their votes to the rich, due to their dispa-
rate financial capabilities as well as the decreasing marginal 
utility of money.133 Not only would this result in the exclusion 
of the poor from the public decision-making arena, but it would 
also have an adverse effect because ―candidates chosen in elec-
tions where the wealthy buy the votes of the poor more likely 
 
 128. For an analysis of vote buying from an efficiency perspective, see Zvi-
ka Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, On the Efficiency of Vote Buying When Vot-
ers Have Common Interests, 26 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 536 (2006) (exploring 
the efficiency of vote buying in the specific context of corporate elections). 
 129. See Levmore, supra note 127, at 118 (noting that markets are more 
likely to do a better job of optimizing goods-production by sending the right 
signals to producers than are individual voters).  
 130. See Epstein, supra note 29, at 984–88 (discussing various negative 
externalities stemming from the sale of voting rights in both corporate and po-
litical contexts).  
 131. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 272 (1962). 
 132. See Levmore, supra note 127, at 123. Levmore states that:  
[ I ]f vote selling were legal, many entitled individuals would sell their 
votes at trivial prices even as these voters recognize that a large block 
of votes is a valuable asset. But it does no good for an individual to 
hold out for the value that a buyer might attach to each vote in such a 
block because there are many other potential sellers willing to part 
with their shares for some trivial price. Absent some coordination 
strategy, these voters reason that since others will sell at a low price 
rather than be left holding essentially worthless rights, they too may 
as well sell at a price greater than zero but far less than what might 
be obtained from an eager buyer if these sellers could coordinate. 
Id. 
 133. Hasen, supra note18, at 1325 (noting that the poor are more likely to 
sell their votes than are the wealthy, thereby leading to a regressive system in 
which political outcomes favor the wealthy).  
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will reflect the views of the wealthy.‖134 In other words, if the 
wealthy were able to purchase additional shares in the political 
process, they would be able to take over the process and intensify 
the disproportionality in decision-making power in society.135 
On the Mode of Transfer Axis, the preclusion of vote trad-
ing stems from the relative weightiness of personhood and par-
ticipation considerations. Indeed, translating votes into mone-
tary currency seems to fundamentally contradict the essence of 
what it means to be a part of a democratic society. It has been 
asserted that voting is not only about preference satisfaction or 
personal gain, but also about the realization of one‘s civic per-
sonhood.136 In light of what Sandel terms ―the republican ideals 
implicit . . . in contemporary democratic practice,‖ the expe-
rience of collective decision-making is distinct from and greater 
than the sum of individual votes.137 Something important is 
missing, therefore, when a single right is sold for personal gain. 
In addition to its detrimental impact on civic personhood, mar-
ketability creates negative effects in the commodification of the 
interaction between the parties. As Levmore has noted, 
―[p]erhaps the most defensible or intuitive form of the anti-
commodification argument stresses the communal nature of 
voting; a voting right is like an invitation to a party, and both 
are nontransferable for the same externality reason.‖138 
Participation considerations also bear considerable weight 
in the context of voting rights, pulling towards inalienability. 
As we argued in the framework of the justifications for aliena-
bility on participation grounds, markets tend to decentralize 
decision-making power in society and, therefore, restrain the 
centralistic, otherwise absolute, state power.139 In the case of 
 
 134. Id. at 1330. 
 135. See id. (arguing that ―[e]ven if the poor would be willing to accept 
money in return for giving up the right to vote,‖ egalitarians would object to 
this sale based on the belief that the rich and poor should have equal influence 
over political outcomes). 
 136. Karlan, supra note 39 (arguing that ―the right to vote serves a power-
ful expressive function‖ and captures the ideal of ―civic inclusion‖); see also 
Sandel, supra note 99, at 114–18.  
 137. Sandel, supra note 99, at 118; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, 
at 963 (noting that although voting, on the one hand, is seen as a private act, 
it also demands well-informed decision making because of its effect on the 
larger democratic society). 
 138. Levmore, supra note 127, at 116; see also ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 
164–65 (noting that certain social spheres and values are governed by participa-
tion in social practices and cannot be effectively governed by market principles). 
 139. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 7–22. 
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voting rights, we posited, marketability seems to add another 
layer of decentralization on top of the initial allocation of these 
rights, which, in itself, approximates the decentralizing effect 
of the market by providing each citizen with a voice and with 
marginal decision-making power. However, in light of the pos-
sibility of capture and cartelization in a market for votes, it 
could in fact be claimed that a market in voting rights would 
operate against the initial decentralization and concentrate de-
cision-making power in the hands of the affluent.140  
Since distributive, personhood, and participation objections 
to alienability play such a central role in the normative equili-
brium in the context of voting rights, and since efficiency gains 
from trade in voting rights are dwarfed by the costs entailed, 
the inalienability in Category A would seem to be the natural 
choice for this particular PE. However, similar to what we 
claimed in the context of the pollution quota debate, with vot-
ing rights, non-tradability need not collapse into complete in-
alienability. Instead, our model offers non-binary options along 
a spectrum of alienability mechanisms: some of the personhood 
and participation concerns raised with regard to trade in voting 
rights could be addressed by moving along the Mode of Trans-
fer Axis to the Gift Row, perhaps even to the Barter Row. In 
other words, these concerns can be contended with through 
alienability mechanisms that prohibit selling votes but, at the 
same time, allow voting rights to be donated to others (gift) or 
even exchanged for a similar kind of consideration (barter), as 
in the 2000 presidential election example opening this paper.141 
 
 140. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1098. 
 141. The distinction between barters and trade in votes was recognized in 
the Nader vote swapping case, where the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that ―[w]hatever the wisdom of using vote swapping 
agreements to communicate . . . [voters‘] positions, such agreements plainly 
differ from conventional (and illegal) vote buying, which conveys no message 
other than the parties‘ willingness to exchange votes for money (or some other 
form of private profit).‖ Porter v. Bowen, 496 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007). 
In addition, the court indicated that vote buying may be prohibited ―‗without 
trenching on any right of association protected by the First Amendment.‘‖ Id. 
(quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982)). Yet vote swapping, the 
court noted, involves a ―‗promise to confer some ultimate benefit on the voter, 
qua . . . citizen[ ] or member of the general public‘‖ and the only benefit a vote 
swapper can receive is a ―marginally higher probability that his preferred elec-
toral outcome will come to pass‖ or, in our terminology, the exchange takes 
place within a single scale of valuation. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brown 456 U.S. at 55).  
As to the gift alternative, Rose-Ackerman posits, ―[s]ince voters who pull 
party levers or follow the endorsements of The New York Times are de facto 
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III.  ALIENABLE TAX BENEFITS FOR CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTIONS   
Our discussion has hereto dealt with aligning different  
mechanisms of PE alienability with their underlying normative 
considerations. This correlation between normative equilibria 
and alienability techniques is the essence of our project: to pro-
vide any given normative equilibrium envisioned by society re-
garding a particular PE with the fitting alienability mechan-
ism. This theoretical framework obviously is context 
contingent. The discussion below will devise one possible con-
text in the sphere of PEs, namely, the hypothetical framework 
of a market in tax incentives for charitable contributions. View-
ing tax incentives through our model‘s lens and through the 
prism of its flexible conception of alienability illustrates the 
benefits in converting PEs into alienable rights.142 We start out 
by reviewing the rare cases of alienable tax benefits and argue 
that there is no inherent reason to restrict tax benefit alienabil-
ity to these particular settings or to oppose the alienability of 
the vast majority of tax benefits. We demonstrate the prospects 
for expansion of the alienability of tax benefits beyond the ex-
 
donating their votes, why not permit more formal assignments which, like 
corporate proxies, can be revoked at any time before the election?‖ Rose-
Ackerman, supra note 4, at 963. In line with our discussion above, the move 
from inalienability to gift, which would allow donation of voting rights, would 
provide the initial right-holder with another avenue of participation even if 
she transfers her right. She would not only be able to exercise or waive her 
right to vote, but also to indirectly participate in the decision-making process 
when transferring it to others, who might enjoy a comparative advantage in 
terms of information or decision-making capacity. In this sense, the transfer of 
votes enhances the power of a single vote and enriches the ways in which it 
can be used beyond electing one‘s favorite candidate in a direct manner. 
Thus, our model accommodates a variety of normative equilibria in terms 
of participation: if passive participation is more essential, then Category A will 
prove the superior mechanism; if active participation is considered more im-
portant, Categories D or E will be preferable. A similar analysis holds with 
respect to the varying nuances of personhood and commodification. If the ob-
jection to alienability of voting rights centers on the monetization of the right 
to vote and is less concerned with the commodification of the interaction and 
its effect on the community, then under our model, sale would be disallowed 
but not necessarily exchanged in-kind by logrolling.  
 142. The analysis in this paper does not mandate a decisive position in the 
larger debate regarding the dichotomy between ―core‖ tax provisions and tax 
expenditures. Our project is not prescriptive in its nature but rather is aimed 
at matching alienability techniques with specific normative equilibria (which 
are the product of political deliberation). Thus, the tax expenditure question, 
like other base-line issues, remains beyond the scope of this paper.  
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isting categories by looking into the example of alienable tax 
benefits for charitable contributions. 
A. ALIENABLE TAX MECHANISMS 
Tax attributes are ordinarily assumed to be inalienable, 
making them a classic Category A case under our model.143 
Some rare exceptions do exist. A well-known example is the 
―safe harbor leasing rules‖ of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981.144 Under this Act generous tax benefits (credits and de-
ductions) provided to various industries were made transfera-
ble.145 Companies that could not use the benefits were effective-
ly permitted to transfer them by providing safe harbor 
leasing.146 This safe harbor regime was repealed by Congress 
 
 143. See SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 18 (criticizing the conventional wisdom 
that maintains ―[p]rovisions that are labeled ‗tax benefits‘ are not supposed to 
be tradable‖). Despite formal inalienability, tax planners have developed a 
host of mechanisms to enable de facto trade in their tax attributes. Cf. id. at 
54 (describing the tax planner‘s job as ―finding pinpricks in the law and driv-
ing trucks through them‖). Various forms of tax arbitrage facilitate trade in 
attributes, ranging from deductions (e.g., depreciation or childcare expenses) 
that lower taxable income, to losses that could offset taxable income, to credits 
(e.g., affordable housing credits or foreign tax credits) that may lower tax lia-
bility, to specific exemptions (e.g., a tax exemption for non-profits or for people 
with disabilities). See I.R.S. Pub. 17-10311G (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. Traditionally, such attributes are offered to a 
selected group of taxpayers who either earned the right to hold them (e.g., lost 
money or invested in affordable housing) or have certain unique features (e.g., 
are disabled or are working parents). See id. In practice, however, a variety of 
planning tools have emerged—often to the dismay of the tax authorities—that 
allow some of these attributes to be enjoyed by taxpayers other than the origi-
nal beneficiaries. Cf. Laura Saunders, 30 Last-Minute Tax Tips, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 2, 2011, at B7, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034615 
04576230743028469786.html. Accordingly, depreciation deductions are being 
traded through leasing transactions, losses are shifted through stripping  
mechanisms or flow-through entities, and credits are exchanged through ex-
dividend transactions or by partnering with taxpayers who can actually use 
them. Cf. Batchelder, supra note 10, at 33 n.36 (detailing how some tax credits 
are sold by developers to syndicated partnerships that recruit investors who 
can use the tax credit to become limited partners in the project). These prac-
tices, however, are restricted to those who can afford the high fees of tax plan-
ners and the risk and potential costs of litigation. Cf. id. at 30 (describing the 
administrative and compliance costs associated with refundable credits).  
 144. The safe harbor provision was found in § 168(f )(8) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code and was enacted in Title II, § 201(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 203 (repealed 1982). For a de-
tailed overview of safe-harbor leasing, see generally Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & 
Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe 
Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982).  
 145. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 144, at 1762. 
 146. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 17–18. Shaviro describes this safe 
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the very next year in the face of public protest and a higher 
than expected budget deficit.147 Another, more recent, example 
of alienable tax benefits can be found under Louisiana‘s film 
and TV tax credit program, approved by the State Legislature 
in 2002.148 According to this program, the State grants market-
able tax credits worth up to 30 percent of the movie production 
costs.149 Out-of-state companies often sell the excess credits to 
Louisiana-based firms or individual taxpayers, who then use 
them to reduce their tax liability.150 Similar arrangements have 
been applied in Louisiana with regard to companies partnering 
with Louisiana universities under the State‘s Technical Com-
mercialization Credit Program.151 In Virginia, the 2002 
Amendment to the Land Conservation Act of 1999152 provides 
another example of alienable tax benefits, allowing landowners 
to sell tax credits given for conservation easements to other 
taxpayers.153 In addition to these existing tradable benefit re-
gimes, there have been proposals to provide transferable tax 
benefits to financial institutions managing Individual Devel-
opment Accounts (IDAs).154 
Though these examples illustrate the viability of making 
tax attributes alienable, the current frameworks represent only 
the very margins of the tax arena. We maintain that serious 
consideration should be given to making tax attributes aliena-
ble on a broader scale. Like in other regulatory areas, alienable 
tax attributes offer a promising venue site for tax policy.155 In 
 
harbor as amounting to transfers of fees at arm‘s length, although the act did 
not literally permit sale of these benefits. Id. at 18. For a detailed description 
of the transfer technique, see id.  
 147. See id. (describing the roots of this public outrage as anchored in the 
―fact that safe harbor leasing actually was working as intended‖). 
 148. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 149. Id. See also Overview: Production Incentives, LOUISIANA ECON. DEV., 
http://www.louisianaentertainment.gov/film/content.cfm?id=149 (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2011) (providing a description of the law). 
 150. Overview: Production Incentives, LOUISIANA ECON. DEV., supra note 
149 (―The incentives are fully transferable and Louisiana has no limit to the 
amount of incentives that can be earned by a single production.‖). 
 151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2352–2365 (2009) (renewed by 2011 La. 
Acts. 416). 
 152. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-513(C)(1) (2010). 
 153. See W. Eugene Seago, The Effects of the Virginia Land Preservation 
Credit on Federal Taxable Income: Should the Right Hand Take From What 
the Left Hand Gave?, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
 154. See CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. § 511 (2003) (cited in Bat-
chelder et al., supra note 10, at 33 n.36). 
 155. Obviously, certain tax benefits would be less suitable than others as 
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what follows, we use the normative infrastructure developed in 
Part II to construct the appropriate alienability mechanisms 
and design a market for tax attributes in the context of charit-
able contributions. We chose these particular tax attributes as 
our test case since the discourse on tax benefits for charitable 
contributions is premised upon a variety of teleological objec-
tives.156 This multiplicity of ends allows us to move along the 
two axes of our model in order to illustrate the nuanced distinc-
tions and creative applications that we envision for alienable 
PEs. We will demonstrate how moving away from box A (in-
alienable PEs) offers varying kinds and levels of benefits in this 
particular context. Namely how, given particular budgetary 
constraints on the public resources invested in charities, differ-
ent forms of alienability prove superior to complete inalienabil-
ity in terms of efficiency, distributive justice, autonomy, per-
sonhood, and participation. It will emerge that various 
mechanisms of alienability along the spectrum (unrestricted 
sale, restricted sale, restricted gift) can accommodate differen-
tiated normative equilibria similar to those cases discussed in 
Part II. 
B. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF CHARITABLES 
Tax benefits likely contribute to the size and success of the 
charitable sector.157 There are many ways to design a tax sys-
tem that supports charitable contributions (and, even more so, 
that supports charitable organizations).158 Some possibilities 
are direct subsidies,159 tax exemptions for charitable organiza-
tions,160 or tax incentives directed at contributors to these or-
 
objects of transfer. For example, one may distinguish between allocational and 
distributive tax expenditures in this regard. For a discussion of this distinction 
in the context of a general anti-avoidance rule, see Tim Edgar, Building a Bet-
ter GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833 (2008). Our purpose here is only to provide an 
illustrative example of the potential benefits of alienability in the tax context, 
depending upon the promotion of pre-determined normative ends and follow-
ing a political deliberation process. The precise guidelines for when alienabili-
ty would prove preferable for the provision of a specific tax benefit are beyond 
the scope of our current project.  
 156. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Sub-
sidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 507–11 
(2010). 
 157. Id. at 513–14. 
 158. See id. at 511–13. 
 159. See id. at 517. 
 160. See id. at 511–13. 
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ganizations.161 Our discussion will focus on the third alterna-
tive: tax benefits for contributors.  
Opinions vary as to the focal point of the justification for 
such benefits.162 Whereas some traditional scholars regard the 
deduction for charitable contributions to be merely a proper 
way of measuring income,163 contemporary scholars tend to 
emphasize that the deduction for charitable contributions is a 
subsidy for the promotion of desirable social goals.164 As such, 
these benefits give rise to a need for further inquiry into their 
underlying normative justifications. 
One line of reasoning justifies tax benefits for charitable 
contributions on distributional grounds.165 Under this line of 
argument, charities tend to serve the weaker segments of socie-
ty, and subsidization is thus a form of redistribution.166 Others 
contest this reasoning on empirical grounds, claiming that 
many charitable organizations cater to the needs of the affluent 
rather than the poor (e.g., opera houses, theaters, and mu-
seums).167 Yet others emphasize the efficiency perspective, 
holding that tax attributes correct market failures, which de-
rive from information deficiencies and free-riding tendencies in 
the market for charity.168 The thrust of this argument is that 
charities provide mixed public goods that confer non-excludable 
and non-rivalrous positive externalities on the public at 
large.169 Absent state subsidization, free-riding would lead to 
under-supply of these goods and services.170 Other scholars em-
 
 161. See id. at 511. 
 162. Id. at 513–14. 
 163. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313–15 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal 
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 344 (1989) (summarizing 
Andrews‘ model). 
 164. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 
84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1058 (2009); David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable De-
duction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533 (2006).  
 165. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 164, at 562–64 (summarizing current dis-
tributional theory scholarship). 
 166. See id. at 563 (―On the other hand, many charities subsidized by the 
deduction do cater to worse-off persons and thereby effect a progressive redi-
stribution of welfare organizations.‖). 
 167. Id. at 562–63; see Henry Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Per-
forming Arts, 12 BELL J. ECON. 341, 342 (1981). 
 168. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 164, at 1058–62. 
 169. Id. at 1058–59. 
 170. Id. at 1059 (―Through contributions, charitable organizations increase 
their supply and lower the prices of the public goods they provide. Charitable 
relief also mitigates the free-riding problem by reducing the price of contribu-
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phasize the information benefits of privatizing the decision-
making process regarding the ultimate destination of the public 
funded subsidies.171 By allowing the public to decide which 
charities enjoy public support, rather than being determined by 
central planning through direct grants, the regulator reaps the 
benefits of the synergy of private information.172 This allows for 
more informed and efficient funneling of public resources.173 
Furthermore, tax benefits for charitable contributions serve as 
a preference-revealing mechanism, in that private donations 
are a prerequisite for public support. Only those private donors 
expressing a high demand for the given charity enjoy greater 
public support of their chosen charity, and vice versa.174 Public 
choice considerations have also been raised in support of decen-
tralizing the decision-making process. As Levmore asserts, the 
involvement of taxpayers in this process mitigates rent-seeking 
opportunities that might otherwise affect the legislative 
process.175 
In addition to the efficiency-based considerations underly-
ing tax benefits for charitable contributions, writers in the field 
have raised participation-based rationales: ―subsidies are war-
ranted because a democratic process dependent on majority 
preferences will only supply public goods at a level demanded 
by the median voter.‖176 Tax benefits for charitable contribu-
tions allow individuals with a vision of the public good that is 
distinct from that held by the majority to redirect some of the 
public resources toward their particular vision.177 In this way, 
tax benefits perform the unique political function of bypassing 
the majoritarian decision-making process: not only affecting the 
channeling of public resources but also expanding the choice-
making capacity of individuals.178 Levmore offers an interesting 
twist to the participation argument in this context, suggesting 
that such active and direct participation by the taxpaying pub-
lic in the decision-making process regarding which projects are 
funded, enhances the commitment to these charities.179 Finally, 
 
tions and encouraging more private giving to underprovided social goods.‖). 
 171. See, e.g., id. at 1061. 
 172. See id. at 1061–62. 
 173. See id. at 1062.  
 174. See Fleischer, supra note 156, at 527. 
 175. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 408 (1998). 
 176. Fleischer, supra note 156, at 521. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; see also Levmore, supra note 175, at 405–06. 
 179. Levmore, supra note 175, at 406. 
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tax benefits for charitable contributions have also been justified 
on personhood grounds. Charitable organizations operate out-
side the market realm, are constructed on altruistic motiva-
tions, and constitute non-market scales of valuation.180 There is 
room to claim that these non-market associations enrich society 
in facilitating alternative routes of human interaction.181  
In sum, granting tax benefits for charitable contributions 
promotes various value-based ends that are external to the par-
ticular goods and services provided by the charities: distribu-
tive justice, efficiency, participation, autonomy, and person-
hood. Different normative equilibria emerge from different 
mixes of these considerations. We will now proceed to match 
mechanisms of alienability to these various equilibria. 
1. Unrestricted Sale of Charitable Benefits 
Under prevailing U.S. law, itemizing taxpayers are allowed 
a deduction of up to 50 percent of their adjusted gross income182 
for contributions to tax-exempt organizations.183 This deduction 
mechanism has a regressive effect, in that it allows high-
income taxpayers to reap greater benefits from their contribu-
tions as a result of their higher marginal tax rate, while indi-
viduals lacking tax liability are deprived of this benefit.184 In a 
recent article Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., and Pe-
ter R. Orszag propose, instead, a uniform refundable tax credit 
 
 180. See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incen-
tives, Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 
225–28 (2009). 
 181. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 164–65. For an application in the 
tax context, see Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93 
(2009), which argues that charitable organizations and charitable donations 
can be conceived of as another point along a spectrum of activities that are or-
dered according to their relation to personhood. This spectrum ranges from 
unrealized talents (endowment), to self-provided services (imputed income), to 
the provision of services within families and their mutual provision among 
friends (gifts). Id. at 115–30. ―Such a spectrum can further be extended to in-
clude . . . charitable contributions, where tax credits can be explained as a 
subsidy for nonmarket (not-for-profit) institutions.‖ Id. at 135. The tax treat-
ment of these activities can (and, in many cases, does) reflect a degree of (non-) 
commodification correlating to their position on the spectrum. Id. at 131. In 
other words, the current support for charitable contributions is a form of fos-
tering altruistic, non-market behavior as a good in and of itself. 
 182. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2006); see also id. § 170(b)(1)(G) (defining ―contri-
bution base‖ as ―adjusted gross income‖). 
 183. Such organizations must promote religious, charitable, scientific, lite-
rary, or educational ends. Id. § 170(c). 
 184. See Batchelder et al., supra note 10. 
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equal to a fixed percentage of tax payers‘ contribution.185 The 
authors point to the efficiency-based virtues of such a tax re-
gime for all tax incentives, charitable incentives included.186  
It is our claim, however, that even such a non-regressive, 
one-size-fits-all mechanism has substantial downsides in terms 
of efficiency and participation. From the efficiency angle, the 
refundable credit mechanism misallocates incentives on both 
the high end and the low end of the target population, leading 
to a waste of public resources. Due to the uniform nature of the 
tax benefit, there will be contributors for whom lower tax in-
centives would have sufficed to motivate them to make an iden-
tical contribution and who now receive unnecessary excessive 
benefits. The mirror image of the misallocation problem relates 
to those taxpayers interested in contributing above the cap, if 
provided with a tax benefit, who would forego the additional 
contribution absent the tax incentive. For simplicity we will he-
reby refer to both manifestations of the misallocation of incen-
tives phenomenon as a problem of over- and under-
inclusiveness. We argue that making the tax credit alienable 
will entail efficiency gains on both fronts.187  
In addition to its efficiency drawback, the refundable credit 
mechanism also hinders participation in the decision-making 
process regarding the channeling of tax benefits. Specifically, it 
limits involvement exclusively to contributors and correlates 
the extent of their impact with contribution level. One could 
argue that the decision-making capacities as to the allocation of 
public funds (as opposed to personal resources) should not be 
assigned according to ability or willingness to contribute to 
charity. If that is the case, we should note that the credit mech-
anism marginalizes the influence of non-contributors on such 
decisions and their ability to voice their preferences as to reci-
pient charities of public funding. It is our contention that mod-
ifying this mechanism through resort to the alienability option 
and adherence to the principles underlying our model could re-
solve these problems. Moreover, allowing for alienability of tax 
benefits for charitable contributions would broaden the spec-
 
 185. Id. at 43. An example of a uniform refundable tax credit is 20 cents 
per dollar, irrespective of the taxpayer‘s liability. In order to sustain a budge-
tary constraint, the refundable credit must be capped at a certain level. 
 186. See id. at 43–57 (arguing that the default for all tax incentives for so-
cially valued activities should be uniform refundable tax credits). 
 187. This is not to suggest that the proposed model ensures Pareto efficien-
cy. Instead it is designed to allow for Pareto improvements in terms of level of 
contribution for a given public expenditure. 
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trum of choices offered to individuals, in a way that furthers 
their autonomy as well as assists in the realization of distribu-
tive goals.  
We shall begin with the efficiency considerations. The 
claim we will formulate in this regard is that alienability can 
mitigate waste of public resources and increase the overall sum 
of contributions per given public expenditure on subsidies for 
charity.188 In other words, alienability could lead to Pareto im-
provement189 over parallel inalienable regimes. The underlying 
intuition is that since taxpayers vary in their preferences for 
charitable contributions, and thus in the marginal benefits they 
derive from donations, granting a uniform benefit is bound to 
be high for some taxpayers and low for others. Absent the op-
tion of alienability, the obvious solution to the over-
inclusiveness problem (reduction of the benefit) could aggravate 
the under-inclusiveness problem (creating an incentive which is 
too low for those with a low preference for donations). Alterna-
tively, one could suggest increasing the cap to allow for more 
contributions by high-preference taxpayers. Unfortunately, this 
option will not work either, as it is likely to break the given 
budgetary constraint.  
Therefore, improving efficiency under a given budget re-
quires fine-tuning of the high-end incentive (so as not to pro-
vide excessive subsidies for contributors) while preserving the 
level of contributions. Alienability offers an attractive policy op-
tion here: Allowing taxpayers to sell their tax credits will let 
the government break its given budget into smaller incentive 
packages and thus mitigate the over-inclusiveness problem. At 
the same time, it would neutralize the risk of under-
inclusiveness by increasing the number of such packages and 
creating a market for tax benefits that will efficiently allocate 
them. This market would facilitate the purchase of tax benefits 
beyond a given cap: individuals wishing to contribute in excess 
of the cap but still enjoy tax benefits for the surplus would be 
able to purchase those benefits from individuals uninterested 
in contributing to charity. These market features would allow 
for a modular and differential consumption of benefits, better 
 
 188. It should be noted that the proposed model is not aimed at reaching 
the optimal subsidy-contribution ratio. Rather, it assumes a pre-determined 
social decision as to how many public resources should be designated in order 
to induce contributions in society, and the model seeks its optimal targeting so 
as to maximize contribution level under a budgetary constraint. 
 189. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 18 (5th ed. 1997) (de-
scribing the Pareto principle). 
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suited to the incentive structure for donations and thus leading 
to the channeling of tax benefits to their most efficient users.  
2. Example: 
To illustrate this point, assume the government is interest-
ed in spending $2000 to support charitable contributions and 
that the taxpaying population is comprised of twenty taxpayers 
with varying levels of preference for charitable contributions. 
For purposes of clarity, assume a random distribution of prefe-
rences for contributions, expressed in the table below as the 
monetary benefits of making a $500 contribution. These range 
from $300 to $480 for each taxpayer. Suppose the government 
provides each taxpayer with a uniform benefit of $200 per $500 
contribution. This will lead to 10 contributions (marked in 
bold) of $500, totaling $5000 in charitable donations, at a so-
cial cost of $2000.  
 
Figure 2: 
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Such a mechanism would suffer from the over-
inclusiveness problem described above, in that it would provide 
a $200 benefit to taxpayers who would have contributed $500 
even with a lower tax incentive (Donors A–I). Attempting to 
rectify this by reducing the benefit (say to $100 per $500 con-
tribution) would lead to 5 contributors only (Donors A–E), for a 
total of $2500 in contributions at a social cost of $500. Though 
the subsidy-contribution ratio is improved, the result is still 
suboptimal in light of the lower total level of contributions. 
In addition to over-inclusiveness, such a regime also gene-
rates under-inclusiveness, for it limits the amount of subsidized 
contribution to $500 even for taxpayers who may be interested 
in contributing more if given subsidization. It might appear 
that the under-inclusiveness phenomenon could be remedied by 
lifting the subsidized contribution cap. This would, indeed, in-
crease the level of contributions, but at the same time could 
lead to excessive social subsidization of charities. For example, 
if the cap is increased to $1000—namely, a $400 benefit is 
granted per $1000 contribution—this will result in 9 contribu-
tions (Donors A–I) of $1000 each, totaling $9000 in charity at a 
social cost of $3600. 
Though this would yield a better subsidy-contribution ra-
tio, the social investment would exceed the desired $2000 level. 
In other words, though the government has an interest in faci-
litating charities, this is not without limit: since it essentially 
functions as a partner that subsidizes individual contributions, 
the government has an interest in limiting the aggregate level 
of such public participation, regardless of the prospect of great-
er participation by contributors in charities. 
Against this background, now assume that the tax benefits 
were alienable. Under the alienability regime, the over-
inclusiveness problem is mitigated by allocating only a smaller 
$100 benefit per $500 contribution. The decrease in the initial 
benefit would save $100 per contributor for Contributors A–E. 
On the other hand, it will crowd out Contributors F–J, seem-
ingly exacerbating under-inclusiveness. However, allowing in-
dividuals to purchase unused benefits would result in Donors 
A–E purchasing and contributing nine additional benefit pack-
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ages190 more than offsetting this effect. This will result in 14 
contributions of $500 each, totaling $7000 in charity at a social 
cost of $1400, a considerable improvement from the original 
$5000 in contributions raised with $2000 of public money.  
It is certainly possible to imagine other ways of simulta-
neously resolving both ends of the inclusiveness problem.191 
 
 190. Those underlined in the following table:  
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 260 280 300 320 043 H 
  400 280 300 023 I  
   400 280 033 J 
 
 191. Another regulatory remedy for both inclusiveness problems would be 
setting a minimal contribution amount as a precondition for the tax benefit. A 
floor would be beneficial under the plausible circumstances of decreasing mar-
ginal utility with relation to the size of contribution. For example, in the table 
from footnote 190, setting a $2000 floor would allow us to provide only $440 in 
benefits (the average of the marginal contributor, expressed in the fourth row 
of the table). This would lead to four contributions of $2000 (totaling $8000 in 
charity) at a social cost of $1760. Yet, even under such conditions, marketabili-
ty may prove superior, for it opens the way to consolidation of contributions by 
different contributors or, conversely, to fragmentation of the benefit. In other 
words, the market strategy of consolidation may address under-inclusion in 
cases of individuals who have difficulty meeting the minimal contribution re-
quirement and, therefore, do not participate in charitable contribution.  
Consolidation enables such individuals to cooperate with others in a way 
that will increase their overall contribution level. Thus, in our illustration 
from footnote 190, if there were more than a single contributor in each row, 
Contributor E for instance, could join other similar contributors (not described 
in the table) in contributing $500 each. Yet the possibility of consolidation 
could lead to less desirable situations, where individuals who would be in-
duced to meet the floor even without the consolidation option would, given the 
option, cooperate with others in a similar situation, thereby decreasing their 
aggregate level of contribution. For example, in the illustration from footnote 
190, Contributor D, who might have been induced to contribute $2000 absent 
the option of consolidation, could now choose to consolidate with others and 
make only a partial contribution. The end result in terms of whether consoli-
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Tinkering with the cap and benefit amounts—for example, by 
enlarging the former while lowering the latter—could lead to 
an improvement in the level of contributions under a given 
budgetary constraint, and given a preferences distribution 
where a large bulk of the potential donors have a preference for 
high contributions at a low tax incentive. However, this does 
not run counter to our claim, for even under such an improved 
regulatory regime, alienability might still lead to superior re-
sults. So long as there are individuals for whom the cap is too 
low and others for whom the benefit is not great enough, the 
possibility of trade may increase contributions per a given 
budget. 
We would like to conclude the discussion on the efficiency 
perspective of alienable tax attributes by reiterating the pur-
pose of our model. The thrust of our argument is not that the 
alienability option achieves Pareto efficiency under any set of 
circumstances. Rather, our claim is a more modest one, striving 
merely to show that alienability could prove superior to the ex-
isting mechanisms (as well as those proposed by legal scho-
lars)192 under a realistic set of assumptions regarding the inevi-
tability of a budgetary cap on social subsidy of charitable 
benefits and a plausible set of preference distributions. As a re-
sult, total disregard for the alienability option unnecessarily 
constricts the social planner‘s choices from among the best 
possible options. 
Thus far, we have examined the efficiency of an alienabili-
ty regime of tax benefits for charitable contributions. We now 
move to considerations of participation. Recall that a central 
justification of supporting charities by encouraging private con-
tributions (as opposed to direct government funding) is the par-
ticipation of the public in the decision-making process regard-
ing which charities garner public support.193 It is our claim that 
a market for tax attributes would enhance participation in the 
decision-making process by including even non-contributors in 
it. Indeed, providing individuals with a public benefit they can 
either realize (through contribution) or sell to others (who will 
realize the benefit through contribution) gives them the option 
 
dation would improve the level of contribution is essentially an empirical mat-
ter: it all depends on the ratio of these two groups of individuals between those 
with difficulties in meeting the floor and those who, absent the consolidation 
option, would have met the floor. 
 192. See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 10. 
 193. See Benshalom, supra note 164, at 1061–62; Fleischer, supra note 156, 
at 521. 
 2011] RIGHTS FOR SALE 137 
 
of voicing their preferences even if they make no contribution to 
charity. Such individuals could also sell their benefits to the 
charities of their choice. By so doing, they would be able to 
channel public funds to their preferred charity even if they 
cannot afford to or simply choose not to contribute.194 On the 
other hand, allowing non-contributors to take part in the public 
participation may have a downside as well, as non-contributors 
may be less committed to the ideas they support, since such a 
mechanism does not require them to put their money where 
their mouths are. 
Distribution and personhood considerations seem to have 
less of an effect on the unrestricted sale category, and yet there 
is something to be said with respect to each of them: allowing 
taxpayers to sell tax credits for a price may promote wealth re-
distribution, if, as a general matter, buyers of such credits are 
better off than sellers. Under this scenario wealthy individuals 
will pay poor sellers for their unused credits, thus sharing the 
tax benefit with them (meaning that a larger part of the tax 
benefits would get into poor sellers‘ hands than under inaliena-
ble credits). 
While a stronger inclination of the wealthy to contribute 
than of the poor to contribute seems plausible, this is not nec-
essarily the case; sellers may represent individuals who do not 
wish to contribute rather than individuals who are unable to do 
so. If the former is the case, alienability will not necessarily 
further a more progressive redistribution of tax benefits. Still, 
if people‘s low preference for contributions is negatively linked 
with their income level—the bottom line would still be a more 
progressive redistribution scheme.  
As for personhood considerations, there may be room to 
claim that the tradability of credits poses the risk of increasing 
the commodification of charity giving. The mere provision of tax 
credits for contributions has commodifying aspects in and of it-
self, for it incorporates a quid-pro-quo dimension into altruistic 
giving. But allowing such credits to be sold seems to add anoth-
er commodificatory layer, for it involves a market transaction 
 
 194. Even under a sale regime, some contributors may still prefer to ab-
stain from direct exercise of their benefits, because doing so might taint the 
altruistic element of the act of donating. Under the prevailing regime, this ar-
rangement amounts to a simple waiver of the benefit, which thus returns to 
the state. Under an alienability regime, however, such contributors could do-
nate their benefit to the charity of their choice, either for resale under the un-
restricted sale mechanism (Category H) or for use by other donors under the 
unrestricted gift rubric (Category D). 
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in which a price tag is being put on the altruistic dimension of 
giving. A person with a high preference for giving will be in-
clined to pay a higher price for the credits. This is more com-
modifying in two ways. The first way is the exact price tag be-
ing put on the non-altruistic component of the donation (which 
is more accurate and thus perhaps more commodifying than 
the one-size-fits all tax benefit under an inalienable credit). The 
other way is the commodification of the interaction between the 
buyer and the seller (and not only between the donor and the 
tax authorities, which rates them both according to their al-
truistic preferences). 
3. Restricted Sale of Charitable Benefits  
The move from a regime of unrestricted sale to restricted 
sale of charitable benefits could be justified on distributive 
grounds, for unrestricted sale in the context of tax attributes 
could yield adverse effects in terms of distribution. To begin 
with, it could amplify the influence of the better off and enable 
them to direct public resources to the charities of their choice 
by purchasing additional tax benefits for their increased con-
tribution to such charities. This purchasing, in turn, could lead 
to a disproportionate concentration of public resources in the 
hands of charities that cater to the preferences of the better 
off.195 If, for example, affluent individuals have a preference for 
opera houses or theaters as charitable organizations,196 a re-
gime allowing unrestricted sale of tax attributes could lead to 
excessive public support of these institutions and to a biased 
distribution of public resources.  
Shifting to the Category G regime of restricted sale could 
mitigate this undesirable distributive outcome. Limiting the 
sale of tax benefits to non-profit organizations only, while pro-
hibiting such trade with private individuals, could somewhat 
constrain the ability of the better off to purchase excessive deci-
sion-making power. The poor, who typically are less inclined to 
contribute, due to a lack of resources, would be able to sell their 
tax benefits to the charities of their choice, with no accompany-
ing regressive augmentation of the influence of the affluent. 
This could, however, only partially remedy the distributional 
bias, for stronger non-profit organizations (such as opera hous-
 
 195. C.f., e.g., Pozen, supra note 164, at 562–63 (discussing similar poten-
tial implications under the charitable deduction structure). 
 196. Id. at 563 (recognizing opera houses as ―the quintessential exemplar of 
a non-redistributive ‗public charity‘‖). 
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es) might still wield an advantage in terms of ability to pay the 
competitive price of the tax benefits (relative to weaker non-
profits). A possible solution would be to restrict potential trans-
ferees—for example, allowing only pre-specified non-profits to 
purchase the tax benefits. 
Of course, promoting distributional goals in this manner 
may come at a cost in efficiency. Both types of restricted sale 
regimes tinker with market forces by artificially decreasing 
demand and increasing transaction costs. In addition, limiting 
sale to pre-specified charities would, for its part, undercut the 
advantages associated with public participation. Such a restric-
tion provides the social planner with the ability to shape which 
charities reap public funding, thereby re-incorporating centra-
lized planning in what was meant to be a locus of decentralized 
decision making. In sum, if the teleological goals underlying tax 
benefits for charitable contributions gravitate towards distribu-
tive justice, the alienability mechanism most suited to such a 
normative equilibrium is restricted sale. If, however, the effi-
ciency considerations prove more central, an alienability re-
gime of unrestricted sale will be superior. 
4. Restricted Gifts of Charitable Benefits 
Giving extra voice to the better off not only raises distribu-
tive concerns (related to the outcomes of the decision-making 
process), but could also be problematic in the context of the de-
liberation procedure itself (irrespective of its end results). As 
argued above, participation in the public discourse over the 
channeling of public support to various charities is constitutive 
of one‘s civic personhood and should, therefore, not be contin-
gent solely upon contribution capabilities. The civic personhood 
concern is reinforced by Levmore‘s claim that involvement in 
the decision-making process, regarding public funding of non-
profits, facilitates social commitment to charity work and in-
centive to monitor charitable activity.197 Lastly, we must bear 
in mind the benefits associated with the preservation of mul-
tiple spheres of valuation in this regard. As we asserted above, 
such non-market associations enrich society in facilitating al-
ternative avenues of human interaction. This array of concerns 
shifts the focus from the Potential Transferees Axis to the 
Mode of Transfer Axis and could justify moving from a sale re-
gime to a gift regime in our model: the incommensurability of 
 
 197. Levmore, supra note 175, at 406. 
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tax benefits across spheres of valuation would insulate the de-
cision regarding the identity of the ultimate benefactors of the 
particular tax attributes from monetary considerations. These 
advantages come at a cost, of course: representation without 
(non-)taxation enables individuals to impact decision-making 
without putting their money where their mouths are. The ques-
tion whether the pros outweigh the cons and the normative 
weights that are to be attributed to the various personhood, 
participation and efficiency considerations are all essentially 
political issues, to be decided through public deliberation in 
each given society. We do not aspire to resolve this political 
matter ourselves. Rather, our claim is that if in a given society 
considerations of civic personhood and preservation of altruistic 
spheres are of significance, a gift regime may prove preferable 
to that of sale.  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article is an exercise in expanding the horizons of le-
gal imagination by portraying a world where alienability of 
public entitlements is a viable option, rather than a rare excep-
tion. The conceptualization of publicly provided benefits as 
alienable entitlements was made possible by the two key com-
ponents underlying our model—namely, the non-binary concep-
tualization of alienability, as well as the exposure of the over-
looked interpersonal dimension of public entitlements. 
Analyzing public entitlements through the nuanced alienability 
prism enriches the understanding of the ways in which various 
alienability regimes, as well as the public entitlements whose 
scope they define, can be utilized to promote various normative 
goals. Application of our theory of PE alienability to the unex-
plored terrain of tax benefits for charitable contributions pro-
vided a hands-on illustration of the potential of alienability as a 
policy tool, and of the ways in which various alienability  
mechanisms can be utilized to promote any given choice of 
normative end 
